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This report describes the design and use of the pilot study
concept as a preliminary step in directing Navy program evaluations.
This methodology focused specifically upon the Navy Leadership and
Management Education and Training Program [LMET] to identify relevant
effectiveness issues to provide program managers necessary guidance for
overall program evaluation. Interviews of a cross-section of 51 LMET
graduates, their immediate supervisor and subordinate were conducted in
an effort to determine leadership/management improvement. Results
indicate specific recommendations concerning; the use of pilot studies,
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In late 1978, the U. S. Navy adopted a massive training program for
its personnel in leadership and management. The program is planned to
systematically replaced all existing leadership-management courses of
instruction. Its implementation was Navy-wide with first priority for
school quotas given to personnel assigned to operational fleet units.
As the only leadership-management program in the Navy, it was large and
applied to all Naval levels of command. Due to its widespread
application, the program required large resource expenditures in time,
manpower and money. Manpower requirements were expended in students
attending the ten day course as well as instructor and administrative
time. The overall goals of the program known as Leadership and
Management Educating and Training [LMET] were:
To provide a formal and systematic training program for
professional development of Navy leaders at critical points
in their careers, based on research of effective Navy leader-
ship.
To train officers and petty officers in the specific leader-
ship and management skills needed to perform effectively at
their level in the chain of command.
To conduct ongoing evaluation for improving and updating these
programs
.
To encourage Navy leaders to take personal responsibility for
implementing effective leadership skills, by means of an edu-
cational approach that emphasizes individual initiative and
accountability for effective performance as a Navy leader.
[HRMC,N.D.,p.7]
The cost of the program was to be offset through "increasing the Navy's
ability to achieve its overall mission by increasing the effectiveness
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of Navy leadership across all levels of the chain of command."
[CNET,N.D.,p.5]
The Navy has, and continues to invest time, manpower resources and
money into this program. Yet, there has been to date little effort de-
voted to evaluation of its effectiveness or results. The question of
where does the program stand today, remains unanswered. Recent
comments of LMET instructors concerning the course vary, typically:
The course if not fun to teach the [teacher] burnout
ratio is high.
It will raise the average guy or top performer. .. .it won't
work for the below average performer, we've lost some.
It is a seed planting evolution with attempts at behaviorial
change
You have to sacrifice one [student] for the good learning of
twenty-eight others.
You can't tell a student he is wrong [You can] hope to
make him see what his affect is on others.
Additionally, the question arises, what is the perceived value of the
LMET Program to managers and leaders? Recently interviewed graduates
of the LMET course had these remarks concerning their training:
Before LMET I didn't know which way to go LMET produces
immediate results it really helped me.
LMET probably helped this guy more then any other professional
school in his career
If the decision was mine I wouldn't send anybody to it [LMET
School]
It [LMET School] showed me things that were not clear be-
fore it helped me to understand myself.
If the command doesn't support the training [LMET School] the
man receives then I wouldn't send anyone else that is




Clearly, there is disagreement among those teaching and implementing, as
well as those receiving the training.
The Navy in the late 1960's and early 1970's was confronted by a
number of contemporary problems that were indicative of the turmoil
within society as a whole. These problems included drug and alcohol
\
abuse, high rates of absenteeism, low retention rates of skilled tech-
... J
mcians, high attrition of newly recruited personnel, and an atmosphere
of crisis management. It was difficult to link any given problem to a
simple cause and effect relationship. Rather, the problems appeared to
be intertwined around the issue of ineffective leadership and manage-
ment at all levels within the chain-of-command. It was imperative that
action be taken to reverse this situation and it was to that end that the
Navy turned to the LMET Program.
It is now mid-1981 with the LMET Program ending its third year. As
with any large program, LMET was designed to achieve certain goals while
solving specific problems. In order to determine if LMET has done this,
that is to judge its effectiveness, it is necessary to evaluate it. Such
an evaluation would determine if the program is accomplishing its stated
goals. In fact, one of the goals of the program specifically called for
ongoing evaluation and updating. [CNET,N.D.] The developer of the
program, McBer and Company, also recommended an on going evaluation. With
an evaluation, Navy leaders could assess its health thereby assuring that
it remain an ongoing program, meeting its goals within the Navy. This
evaluation is especially important to program managers to enable them to
judge its cost effectiveness during these times of austere funding. De-
termining whether the LMET Program is "increasing the effectiveness of
Navy leaders is, however, no simple task.
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Evaluation of any large, Navy-wide program, such as LMET, is in
itself an expensive undertaking in terms of budgetary considerations as
well as time and manpower requirements. For this reason the results must
be valid and relevant to the program being evaluated. Before embarking
upon such a task as program evaluation, decision makers need some
assurance that the evaluation will in fact provide relevant data about
the program under examination. In addition, the necessity to conduct an
efficient yet thorough evaluation further compounds the decision maker's
dilemma. One method of beginning such an evaluation is through the use
of a pilot study. The concept is basically for an organization, such as
the Navy, to use some of its own assets to conduct a mini-evaluation of
the program. This Pilot Study could test the hypothesis, questions, and
methodology with which a larger, full scaled evaluation may be conducted.
In evaluating the pilot study outcome, revisions or changes can be made
prior to commencing the much costlier evaluation.
This then is the focus of this research, to conduct a pilot study
of the Navy's LMET Program, thereby assisting in the development of a
larger, full scale evaluation. The pilot study was undertaken by two
Naval officer graduate students using a design technique and strategy
developed with the assistance of McBer and Company and past experience.
Data from the study was used to provide a rough, first-cut evaluation of
the LMET Program and more importantly, an evaluation of the methodology
used. This information can then be applied by the sponsor of this study
to design a full scale evaluation of the LMET Program.
14

The thesis is divided into six major chapters; the first chapter is
the introduction. The second is a brief history of the evolution of
leadership philosophy and development within the Navy, with specific
background on the development of the Navy LMET Program. Emphasis is
placed on Dr. D. McClelland and McBer and Company's concepts on motive
acquisition and competency identification. The LMET Program is detailed
with additional thoughts offered on the need for its evaluation. The
third chapter discusses those issues and problems anticipated in the
design of the pilot study itself including the methodology that was used.
Next is a description of the actual pilot study that was conducted,
including a discussion on preparations for data gathering,
pre-arrangements conducted with respondents and the method used to
analyze data. In simple terms it is what happened and when, during the
pilot study. The fifth chapter is the analysis and findings of the Pilot
Study research. It is divided into two major areas, that of the
interview methodology [process] and a rough analysis of the data
[content] as it applies to LMET specifically. The final chapter is an
assessment of the Pilot Study concept, with recommendations directed
toward a full scale LMET evaluation.
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II- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NAVY LEADERSHIP AND TRAINING
A. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF NAVY LEADERSHIP
Since the birth of the United States Navy, senior officers have
recognized the ability of certain skilled leaders to motivate subordin-
ates in achieving seemingly unattainable goals. These were the leaders
who were called upon in time of need for accomplishment of those tasks to
which others had failed. They were the ones called upon when certainty
of the outcome was more than desirable, but rather a necessity. Using
these leaders as shining examples of what a good Naval leader should be,
the Navy ingrained in its leaders the "tradition" of outstanding
leadership, laced with names such as John Paul Jones, Truxtun,
Bainbridge, Porter, Perry, Farragut, Taussig, Halsey and Nimitz. In
order to be a really great leader one had only to emulate these fine
examples, the Great Man concept. The traits that great leaders viewed as
being desirable were obviously the traits that would create good leaders.
Hence, John Paul Jones' thoughts in "Code of a Naval Officer", were
memorized by midshipman as the proper conduct for a Naval officer.
Pleble's emphasis on discipline and drilling was the gospel on the
training of subordinates, while Farragut 's disregard of "Torpedoes" was
an example of leader courage. Additionally, what was left unsaid but
amply demonstrated, was that good leaders would inevitably become famous
for their abilities. Hence, an end means inversion occured developing
the notion that, if one were well known or famous, then one must surely
be a great leader.
16

Until World War II, this idea of a tradition bound leader was the
most prevelant view held throughout the Navy. During WW II with the
large influx of personnel due to a quickly expanding Navy, leaders not
ingrained in tradition were introduced. This large influx of leaders at
all levels could not be assimilated into this tradition bound leadership
style. Success or failure of their personal leadership styles were based
largely on the end results achieved, which may or may not have been
steeped in tradition. Since on-the-job leadership training was not
practical, it was viewed that some rudimentary training in leadership
could avoid the pitfalls of this trail and error method of leadership.
Leadership training would improve the performance of those born leaders
as well as those less capable personnel occupying leadership positions.
Since World War II, the Navy has emphasized its training at the be-
ginning of a person's military service with such programs as boot camp,
Officer Candidate School, and "Plebe" summer at the Naval Academy.
Occupational training is generally given immediately after boot camp and
prior to the assignment to his permanent unit. Contained within these
programs were included some aspects on "leadership" training as well as
"discipline". For the enlisted personnel the emphasis was on discipline,
the necessity of promptly obeying lawful orders with adherence to
organizational norms in the form of Naval regulations. For the officer
the emphasis was on the basic responsibilities as a leader and the rudi-
mentary skills needed to direct the efforts of others. Leadership con-
tinued to remain a near sacred term, steeped in tradition and assumed to
be something a person was born with or without. Until the 1950' s,
leadership training within the Navy was not viewed with any serious
17

concern for modification. New management ideas developed by the civilian
sector were largely ignored and not incorporated within any Naval
training. In a Navy where disciplinary standards were well established;
manpower supplies were adequate to sustain manning levels; and training
costs for necessary skills were not out of control, there was no perceiv-
ed need for further leadership training.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF NAVY LEADERSHIP TRAINING
1. The 1950' s
With the introduction of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
[UCMJ] into the Navy in 1951, the nation's concern for the individual
rights of soldiers and sailors became evident. This necessitated an
examination of the traditional leadership style then practiced throughout
the Navy. Soon this concern became focused on symptoms that were viewed
as evidence of poor or misdirected leadership. Sources for this concern
included: responses from two thirds of a sample of 10,000 U. S. Navy
sailors who perceived that their officers and petty officers were not
interested in them as human beings; a brig population that had grown
equal in size to the entire U. S. submarine force; and, the shocking
information that some 70 percent of the II. S. prisoners of war in Korea
had actively collaborated with their captors. [HUBBELL, 1960]
Under this pressure and influence, line officers along with
civilian leaders began to take a closer look at leadership training with-
in the Navy. On May 17, 1958, General Order 21 was issued by the
Secretary of the Navy to all commanding officers to integrate leadership
training into the technical training of their men. [CNP, 1963] The result
of this order was a succession of haphazard training efforts that
18

lacked any clear purpose, theoretical basis, method or goal. Individual
training programs reflected each commanding officer's own ideas, educa-
tional background and knowledge of leadership, as well as how to best
teach it. Regardless of the ineffectiveness of General Order 21, it did
demonstrate a commitment to leadership training from the upper echelon of
the Navy. However, changing emphasis in programs reflected a continuing
frustration at not achieving the hoped for levels of productivity, con-
formity and retention from its personnel.
2. The 1960's
General Order 21 did not meet with its intended success. The
initial acclaim and status that the leadership training program gained as
a separate division in the Bureau of Naval Personnel was lost, as hopes
faded with a lack of tangible results. Reissuance of the order in 1963
did nothing to alleviate the situation. In 1966, Naval leadership
training was incorporated into the broader program of General Military
Training [GMT]. [PARKER, 1980] Leadership training requirements in GMT
were reduced from previous levels. Commanding officers were committed to
train their enlisted personnel ten hours per year in subjects such as
leadership style, the chain-of-command and authority, responsibility and
accountabi 1 i ty. [AUEL , 1 975]
Individual commanding officers, still responsible for implement-
ing the training, saw little evidence of clear purpose or benefit from
the program. The leadership training was typically delegated to a less
capable or already overburdened junior officer. The decline of this
leadership program marked the last time operational commanding officers
would be entrusted with any formal leadership training program.
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Succeeding programs would be centrally controlled and conducted by the
Navy training establishment. The decline and replacement of this program
typifies the course of such efforts within the Navy. As one analysis
suggests, "The leadership program fell victim to its own frills and was
downgraded by Navy Institutional ists, because it was an [Secretary of the




The Navy in 1970 was in a state of rapid change. Society's
problems had spilled over into the Navy while the Vietnam conflict had
severely tarnished the military image. The traditional character and
structure of the Navy was coming under question. Drug and alcohol abuse
as 'well as racial problems were spreading. Imminent conversion to an
all volunteer force promised only additional problems for Navy leaders.
Amid this social upheaval and pressure for change, a relatively young and
unconventional Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
assumed command. In his first year, only nine and one-half percent of
eligible personnel re-enlisted, far below the number required to maintain
mandated personnel strength levels. [PARKER, 1980] The new recruits
necessary to reduce this shortage would ensure that societal problems
would continue to infiltrate and dominate the military scene. ADM
Zumwalt expressed his leadership philosophy in the following terms:
...The style of leadership that accorded best with my
own inclinations and operational efficiency was one of
treating subordinates with consideration and respect. I
had not found that a 'tight' ship had to be an 'uptight'
ship and I had hoped that sooner or later the Navy would
give institutional recognition to this principle by
overhauling such of its procedures and jettisoning such
of its traditions as encouraged martinetism and
20

martinets I am certain that what finally decided
Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, and the Secretary of
the Navy, John Chaffe, to risk jumping me into the posi.
tion of Chief of Naval Operations over the heads of
thirty.three of my seniors was my advocacy of rapid and
drastic changes in the way the Navy treated its uniformed
men and women. [ZUMWALT, 1976, p. 167 -169]
Using a group of hand picked senior officers in the Bureau of
Naval Personnel, ADM Zumwalt tried to establish new philosophies and
procedures. Intending to bring dignity, pride and self. esteem to
sailors and to end the "Mickey Mouse" rules, ADM Zumwalt commenced re.
formulating Navy personnel management policies with his infamous "Z.
Grams".! Training programs in the areas of drug and alcohol abuse,
race relations, overseas diplomacy and leadership were established. The
entire effort was labeled as the Human Goals Plan.
One of the most controversial and opposed aspects of the Human
Goals Plan was its top. down, OMBUDSMEN-like feature. For example, Head,
quarter's "...program managers had wide latitude to intervene at any
level in the Navy organization with stringent requirements for individ-
ual ship participation. . ."[AUEL, 1975] This feature was deeply resented
by many senior Navy officers and petty officers. They claimed Human
Goals mandated actions eroded discipline, took too long, ignored
operating requirements, and resulted in a loss of the immediate superi-
or's credibility. [AUEL, 1975] Thus, ADM Zumwalt' s view of an urgently
needed effort to rid the Navy of rigidity, conflicted with his oppo.
nent's views of a breakdown in discipline in working outside of the
chain of command.
lZ-Gram was a phrase used to denote ADM Zumwalt' s CNO policy
memorandums. Sent simultaneously to all levels of command, this rapid




Opposition to ADM Zumwalt's approach and its unworkability re-
sulted in a structural change in late 1972. The program continued, with
an effort to return it back under the chain-of-command. "The entire
effort had grown quickly, contained many unqualified people in important
jobs and lacked the necessary objectives and assessment machinery to de-
monstrate what, if anything, was being accomplished. "[PARKER, 1980, p. 7]
However, responsibility and reporting arrangements were not the only
problems. "The vague goals of bringing equity, developing management
skills and improving personnel performance were well-intended, but un-
coordinated, unevenly managed, and generally ineffective. "[PARKER, 1980,
p. 7] The problems were compounded by a lack of evaluation to de-
termine its progress or overall success.
The new program, Human Resources Management [HRM], represented
more of a change in name and structure rather than content. Fleet
commanders and other line managers were delegated the responsibility of
continuing these programs. The leadership training program continued
basically unaltered with the exception of a new name, Leadership and
Management Training [LMT]. LMT consisted of a ten day course attended
by personnel in the top four enlisted pay grades and the lower four
officer pay grades. Like those programs that preceeded it, LMT lacked
clear objectives, theoretical basis, and a plan for evaluating its
effectiveness. [PARKER, 1980] In addition, each school developed its
own curriculum and style resulting in wide differences between schools
as to what was actually being presented.
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Racial incidents in 1972 onboard the aircraft carriers Kitty
Hawk and Constellation
,
and the fleet oiler Hassayampa
, created opposi-
tion to ADM Zumwalt's programs from outside the Navy. Many placed the
blame on "permissiveness" resulting from ADM Zumwalt's humanistic
policies. [PARKER, 1980] A special subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee headed by Representative Floyd V. Hicks, in calling
for greater emphasis on leadership training in the Navy, released the
following statement:
"One of the most alarming features of the investigations
was the discovery of lack of leadership by middle manage-
ment in the Navy. It became apparent that while junior
officers, chief petty officers and senior petty officers
were performing their technical duties in a proficient
manner there was a lack of leadership in dealing with
seamen. "[HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1973]
In mid-1974 ADM Zumwalt was replaced as CNO with ADM James R.
Holloway, III, a more conventional leader in terms of Navy leadership.
ADM Holloway was concerned with the seeming lack of discipline, lost
pride, and absence of leadership especially within the ranks of the
Navy's middle managers. As CNO, he set as one of his primary goals, the
improvement of senior petty officer and junior officer leadership per-
formance. As a result, on 28 August 1974 a study was undertaken to
determine the cause of the lack of leadership. More importantly, the
study would assess the needs of the Navy in terms of leadership training
and design improvements necessary to upgrade LMT to meet these needs.
This action would ultimatly lead to the development of the Navy's
Leadership and Management Education and Training Program [LMET], but
would not actually commence for another four years.
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C. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AND TRAINING [LMET]
In early 1975 the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], ADM James L.
Holloway, III, and top Navy leaders found themselves in a dilemma. A
comprehensive review and examination of existing leadership and manage-
ment training had revealed 58 formal training courses and 11 correspond-
ence courses costing 12.8 million dollars a year. [AUEL, 1975] Neverthe-
less, contemporary Navy problems such as high attrition, low retention,
absenteeism, substance abuse and crisis management among its personnel
were continuing to be sited as major problems. In an effort to rectify
the situation, after internally generated Navy studies had produced no
conclusive results, several civilian contractors were asked to submit
training proposals and McBer and Company, a Boston-based research and
development firm, was chosen to develop a program to address the Navy's
leadership and disipline problems. The Navy continued with its broad
based leadership training [LMT], with emphasis on general knowledge of
management concepts and theories until McBer could develop the proposed
skill acquisition program of job relevant, specific practices and
techniques.
1. The Navy LMET Plan
The Navy's plan under McBer would be to develop Naval personnel
at each level of competence required by their jobs. In doing so, the
new program's mission would be "to increase the Navy's ability to
achieve its overall mission by increasing the effectiveness of Navy
leadership across all levels of the chain-of-command."[CNET,N.D.,p.5]
The endeavor would be a systematic training program, researched based
upon Navy situations aimed at specific billet levels, emphasizing
24

individual initiative and accountability. Specifically, its goals would
be:
To provide a formal and systematic training program for
professional development of Navy leaders at critical
points in their careers, based on research of effective
Navy leadership.
To train officers and petty officers in the specific
leadership and management skills needed to perform
effectively at their level in the chain-of-command.
To conduct ongoing evaluation for improving and updating
these programs.
To encourage Navy leaders to take personal responsibility
for implementing effective leadership skills, by means of
an educational approach that emphasizes individual initi-
ative and accountability for effective performance as a
Navy leader. [HRMC,N.D.,p.7]
The formal Navy training plan was issued in February 1979,
several months after the commencement of LMET course training. That
plan addressed the results expected:
Improved leadership and management competence on the
part of the Navy's officers, petty officers and civilian
personnel will enhance the Navy's performance in all
mission areas, and may well provide the margin of supe-
riority at sea that the Navy can achieve over any
potential future adversary. It will also aid in the
resolution of contemporary Navy problems involving
retention, crisis management, disciplinary rates,
attrition, working conditions, etc. LMET is designed to
improve and maintain the requisite level of leadership
and management competence through the Navy total force.
[CN0J979]
2. Theoretical Bases for LMET
Leadership and Management Education and Training [LMET], the
Navy's sole integrated approach to the leadership training problem was
developed by McBer and Company. McBer and Company was set up in 1970 by
Harvard professor David C. McClelland and psychologist David Berlew -
hence the name McBer.
25

McClelland, an eminent clinical psychologist, is well known for
his research on power and achievement motives. [GOLEMAN, 1981, p. 35] In
his book, The Achieving Society
, he discusses research which sought to
isolate certain psychological factors, particulary the need for achieve-
ment and to assess their impact upon the economic growth and decline of
societies. Using scientific, quantitative methods, coupled with the
psychological knowledge of human motivation, he demonstrated how the need
to achieve motive influenced economic development, which, more important-
ly, could better equip man to shape his own destiny. [McCLELLAND, 1961]
Convinced of the achievement motive, McClelland undertook re-
search in the area of motive acquisition. Both behavior theory and
psychoanalysis agree that stable personality characteristics, like
motives, are laid down in childhood and difficult to change.
McClel land's attempt to somehow change these motives in adults raised
problems of both an ethical as well as a methodological nature. Clearly
there were processes in the past which had successfully altered
personality change - most notably devout missionaries. [McCLELLAND, 1965,
p. 322] Using empirical information from behavioral learning experi-
ments, a strategy was set up in an attempt to change or promote the
achievement motive, thereby improving entrepreneurial performance of
businessmen.
McClelland' s motive development program was centered around
twelve propositions of motive acquisition, notions mostly backed by
empirical information or research from various studies. The training
program was designed for small groups [under 25] to be taken voluntarily
over a short duration of time [1-3 weeks]. The educational design of the
course used various methods of content and process presentations to
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achieve the overall goal. The course normally ended with each partici-
pant preparing a written document outlining his goals and life plans for
the next two years. McClelland states, "The participants were to regard
themselves as "in training" for those next two years, in that 10-14 days
is obviously too short a time to do more than conceive a new way of life:
it represents the residential portion of the training only." During
these two years, questionnaires would be sent out each 6 months to remind
them of the issues discussed and to give them information to help
determine how well they were progressing on achieving their self made
goals. [McCLELLAND, 1965, p. 329]
After repeatedly giving the course both at home and abroad,
McClelland 1 s data seemed to suggest that one third of the people remained
relatively unaffected while the other two thirds represented a doubling
of the normal rate of unusual entrepreneurial activity. [McCLELLAND, 1965]
McClelland' s propositions were stated generally enough so that
other terms such as "attitude" or "personality characteristics" could be
substituted for the term "motive". In this way he believed the proposi-
tions would also hold true for other personality variables. [McCLELLAND,
1965, p. 332]
As a final note on his motive development program of training
McClelland wrote, "...rather than developing "all purpose" treatments,
good for any person and any purpose, it [psychotherapy] should aim to
develop specific treatments or educational programs built on laboriously
accumulated detailed knowledge of the characteristic to be changed."
[McCLELLAND, 1965, p. 333] McClelland' s motive development program was to




In early 1971, McClelland [McCLELLAND,1973], criticized the
intelligence or aptitude testing movement in a public lecture given at
the Educational Testing Service in Princeton, New Jersey. McClelland
criticized the intelligence tests just as he had done 15 years earlier,
on the grounds that while they may predict good grades in school they
have little effect in predicting good life outcomes. His own research
supports this notion. Good test scores allow people to get into better
schools, however, after graduation the significance ends - good test
score and bad test score graduates both succeed and fail. McClelland
argues that a much wider array of talents or compentencies should be
assessed to determine college entrance, with an emphasis on "grades in
life" and not "grades in school" .[McCLELLAND,1973,p.7] Good grades in
school falsely lead people to believe that they are more competent and
therefore more likely to do well in life.
McClelland listed six principles as paramount in his alternative
approach, compentency testing, to traditional intelligence testing. Of
the six, two are particularly significant in understanding overall LMET
development.
The first principle concerns criterion sampling. Criterion
sampling means observing people in the field and analyzing their perfor.
mance. A test that is directed at the components of this performance
would be the best test. McClelland states, "If you want to test who will
be a good policeman, go find out what a policeman does. Follow him
around, make a list of his activities, and sample from that list in
screening appl icants ."[McCLELLAND,1973,p.7] General intelligence and
the ability to play word games may not be the best test in determining
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who to hire as a policeman „ a movement toward behavioral analysis is
required.
The second principle concerns the ability to assess competencies
involved in clusters of life outcomes. While criterion sampling can be
used to identify occupational competencies unique to a special job or
task it is also necessary to identify social competencies that contribute
to successful performance. McClelland writes that, "Some of these
competencies may be traditional cognitive ones involving reading and
writing. Others should involve what traditionally have been called
personality variables, although they might better be considered
competencies. "[McCLELLAND, 1973, p. 10] McClelland gives four illustra.
tions of these social competencies, each with supportive research for
both its significance as well as insights into its measurement, they are;
communication skills, patience, moderate goal setting, and ego
develonrent. [YcCLELLAND,1973]
3. LMET Study for the Navy
Using McClelland 1 s research and conceptual ideas on job compe-
tency, McBer and Company, working in close cooperation with the Navy's
Bureau of Personnel [BUPERS], began developing LMET in 1976. Similar
methods and techniques used during the past decade in civilian organi.
zations were adapted for the Navy's overall LMET design. The first task
was to identify what Navy leaders, particularly superior Navy leaders
actually do in handling leadership and management tasks. As Dr. D. G.
Winter explains:
The traditional way of answering the question, "What
makes a good Navy leader?", is to ask people what
personal qualities and skills they believe are important
for leadership and management in a particular job.
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Putting together the answers of people actually in the
job, the answers of superiors [or supervisors], and the
answers of their subordinates [or clients] ought to give
us a collective theory of what that job requires. In
fact, however, this procedure is likely to give us a
mixture of highly specific job tasks and vague plati.
tudes about personal qualities, while neglecting the
qualities that are crucial for excellent or superior
performance. [WINTER, 1979, p. 2]
McBer believes that it is more accurate and relevant to find
out who are the superior and average leaders from the personnel working
closest with them, and then identify what distinguishes them from each
other.
Using Navy commands in San Diego, California and Norfolk,
Virginia, McBer asked commanding officers to identify superior and
average leaders at eight career points: division officer, department
head, executive officer, and commanding officer for commissioned
officers, and petty officer, leading petty officer, leading chief petty
officer, and master chief petty officer of the command for non.commis.
sioned officers. In this way, 51 people [30 superior, 21 average] were
identifed from the Pacific Fleet and 78 people [38 superior, 40 average]
from the Atlantic Fleet. Most combinations of warfare community and
career points were represented in this total sample of 129 officers and
enlisted. [WINTER, 1979]
The personnel were interviewed individually and asked to relate
three incidents in which they felt they did ^ery well, and then three
incidents in which they did not feel yery successful in their present
jobs. 2 The interviews were recorded almost verbatim and analyzed
^The McBer approach is not unique in all respects. The
critical . incident interview was developed by psychologist John
Flanagan during WW II.]G0LEMAN,1981 ,p.39] McBer calls his data
gathering technique behavioral event interviews [BEI].
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carefully to determine what similarities superior Naval leaders had shown
that average leaders failed to show. The interviews of 36 of the Pacific
Fleet sample were used to create a series of 11 competency elements,
grouped into 5 clusters. When scored on the whole sample of 51 Pacific
Fleet interviews, most of the 27 competency elements differentiated the 2
groups. [WINTER, 1979]
To validate their findings, McBer first used the Atlantic Fleet
sample scored by interviewers who did not know if the person was
"superior" or "average". Additionally, a second validation technique was
used involving a new, much larger sample. An extensive battery of paper
and pencil tests was developed and administered to over 1,000 Navy
personnel from petty officer through commanding officer, in the 3 warfare
communities from both fleets. Interviews which could be scored for
competency elements were available on 61 of these persons. [WINTER, 1979]
Further analysis was conducted using 220 persons from the larger sample
size predominately in determining variations of leadership and management
skills on a hierarchial level.
Once a competency element derived from the original interviews
with the sample of Pacific Fleet personnel had been validated by either
of those two procedures, it was considered to be a competency that is
associated with superior leadership and management performance in the
Navy. Sixteen of the original 27 elements were validated in this way.
3
[WINTER, 1979] Those 27 initially identified elements served as the basis
for original LMET curriculum design. [PARKER, 1980, p. 15]
^For a more iTTdepth description of competency identification and
validation the reader should consult the Winter Report [WINTER, 1979] on
LMET theory and research.
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These 16 validated competencies are at the core of the LMET
Program. The basic premise of LMET is that increases in any or all of
those competencies will be associated with improved leadership
performance in the Navy. [WINTER, 1979] Today, the 27 competency
elements have subsequently been reduced to 16 competencies which are
grouped into 5 competency clusters for training purposes. 4
4. The LMET Competencies
A competency is any knowledge, skill, attitude or value which
can be shown to distinguish reliably between effective and less
effective job performance. As Richard Boyatzis, President of McBer and
Company explains, "Competencies are not aspects of a job, but rather
characteristics of the people who do the job best. "[GOLEMAN, 1981 ,p.40]
In other words, a competency is what superior performers do more often,
in more situations, for better results than do average performers.
The first competency cluster is a concern for efficiency and
effectiveness, paraphrased as "doing things well, and wanting to do
better. "[HRMC.N.D, p. 1 1A] Major components of this group include
setting goals and performance standards, and taking initiative, with
the concern for achievement as an underlying thought.
The second competency cluster is the skillful use of influence
or "using influence in a positive fashion. . .not as a personal end . but
toward Navy goals and effectiveness. "[HRMC,N.D. p. 12A] Major components
include influences, team building, development of subordinates and
self-control, with the concern for influence as an underlying thought.






1. Efficiency and Effectiveness
- "Doing things well, and wanting to do
better." Components include:
* Setting goals and performance standards
* Taking initiative
2. Skillful Use of Influence - "Using influence in a positive fashion,.




* Develops subordinates [coaches]
* Self,control
3. Advising and Counseling . "Advise and counsel personnel in order to




4. Management Control - "Optimizing people and resources to the task."
Components include:
* PI ans and organizes





5. Conceptual Thinking . "Applies concepts to a job situation."
Components include:
* Conceptualizes
Reference: U. S. Navy Human Resource Management Center, LMET
Overview Brief, no date.
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The third competency cluster is that of advising and
counseling, further amplified as to "advise and counsel personnel in
order to improve their performance on the job." [HRMC.N.D. ,13A] Major
components of this group include positive expectations, realistic ex-
pectations and understanding.
The fourth competency cluster is that of management control or
to "optimize people and resources to the task." [HRMC,N.D.,14A] Major
compontents are plans and organizes, optimizes use of resources,
delegates, monitors results, rewards and disciplines.
The final competency cluster is that of conceptual thinking or
"identifying and organizing relevant facts to gain a clear understand-
ing of the situation before acting on it." [HRMC,N.D.,15] The only
component of this cluster is that of applying concepts to a job
situation.
In addition to the five competency clusters, the McBer study
identified six basic categories of leadership styles used by the
officers and petty officers interviewed, they are:
a. Coercer - all stick and no carrot
b. Authoritarian - firm but fair
c. Affiliator - people first, task second
d. Democrat - participative manager
e. Pace Setter - do it myself
f. Coach - Management by Objectives [MBO] Manager
McBer found that superior leaders tend to be more skilled in several
styles, recognizing which style fits a given situation. LMET en-
courages situational leadership with the development of a larger re-




LMET is now the formally approved model for Navy leadership
training, although it is not yet completely implemented. To achieve
standardized implementation of the program throughout the Navy, the
Chief of Naval Education and Training [CNET], has been designated
training agent.
The first LMET classes opened in 1978, and the program has
expanded rapidly. Projected yearly outputs for fiscal years 80-84 are
4,840 officers and 12,242 enlisted based upon the number of school
quotas avail able. [HRMC.N.D.] There are currently five levels of LMET
with special emphasis on fleet personnel attending first. These levels
include; commanding officer/ executive officer, department head,
division officer, chief petty officer and petty officer. Officer LMET
is further subdivided with separate classes for aviation, submarine,
and surface ship off icers.[HRMC,N.D.] Personnel returning to the
fleet normally receive LMET enroute to their new permanent duty
station. School quotas can also be obtained by Navy commands for
personnel already at their command on a temporary duty basis. However,
these quotas are extremely difficult to obtain and are offered only on
a space available basis.
LMET is now taught at existing Navy training centers. Sites on
the east coast include: Memphis, Tennessee; Little Creek, Virginia; New
London, Connecticut; Mayport, Florida; Pensacola, Florida; Newport,
Rhode Island; and Charleston, South Carolina. Sites on the west coast
are: Coronado, California; San Diego, California; Bangor, Washington;




All classes last 10 working days, except for the 12 week LMET
instructor course taught at Memphis, Tennessee. Instructors are deemed
to be the key to success of the program. Accordingly, instructors have
been selected against rigorous criteria and trained in LMET concepts
and methods by the program designers. No one is allowed to teach LMET
who is not a graduate of the 12 week LMET instructor course. [OLMSTEAD,
1980]
LMET class sessions are team-taught by two or three instructors,
with officers teaching officer courses and senior petty officers teach-
ing equivalent enlisted personnel. Reportedly, classes generally consist
of 20-24 students.
Each LMET course is based around the competency notion and the
five competency clusters. The training sequence for each competency
consists of lectures to identify and assess how the competency applies,
in the Navy. Through self-analysis exercises and pretesting, students
discover how they learn, as well as the type of management styles they
possess. Skill acquision and practice are developed through games,
role-play exercises and case studies. Finally, through various pro-
cesses the students learn to apply the competencies to tasks similar to
those which will be encountered in their new job assignment.
The personal comprehensive plan is the final activity in
all LMET courses. It is a statement of personal goals,
shaped to the concepts and language of the leadership
competency model . Participants are encouraged to formulate
and describe realistic yet challenging goals that are appro-
priate to their Navy leadership situations, to become aware
of difficulties and obstacles to these goals, and to write




A distinctive feature of LMET courses is the personal student
log, which the participant retains as a written record of the
LMET experience. It contains his or her self-assessment, life
situation, and goals - all phrased in terms of the competency
language. [WINTER, 1979, p. 11-12]
Differences [PARKER, 1980] between classes for higher or
lower ranking personnel are found primarily in the content, setting, and
cast of characters used in the role-play situations, case studies and
general class discussions. Chief petty officer and petty officer
courses have the same level of emphasis, differing primarily in the
seniority of instructions that teach the two levels.
The LMET classes are reportedly [PARKER, 1980] well-paced,
shifting from lecture to discussion to small group activities in a
fashion intended to maintain student interest, to provide frequent
opportunities for students to express feelings and opinions in a
supportive environment, and to trade ideas with their peers. In actual
practice LMET courses may differ slightly from location to location and
class to class as instructors seek to motivate and influence each
particular group. Student critiques completed at the end of the course
indicate that students like LMET. [PARKER, 1980]
7. Future for LMET
As mentioned earlier, LMET has not yet been completely
implemented. Planning through fiscal year 84 will include courses for
more junior petty officers as well as shore commands, Navy civilians,
and Naval Reserve personnel, with the overall goal of training everyone
in a Navy leadership position. The cost of LMET during 1980 was 17
million dollars; for 1982-86, the projected cost is slightly more than
29 million dollars per year. [PARKER, 1980]
37

Curriculum modification, concentrated at the LMET Instructor
School in Memphis, has gone on almost continously since the problem
began. Efforts to improve the program are concentrated in Memphis under
the direction of CNET. Over and above internal course improvement and
development, however, LMET has three longer-range goals:
a. Additional research is planned to provide further vali.
dation and cross-validation of the competencies themselves. Of
particular concern here is pinpointing in greater detail the re.
lative importance [and hence the appropriate instructional
weighting] of each competency at a few "key" Navy billets - for
example, at the commanding officer level and at the petty
officer level
.
b. The test battery will be revised and expanded, in order
to provide instruments and procedures that can be used to assess
individual standards of performance against the competency
profile of superior Navy leaders. When available, such instru-
ments could also be used before and after courses, as measures
of the immediate effectiveness of a person's participation in
LMET.
c. The LMET program will be evaluated. Short-term, inter-
nal course evaluation will provide an immediate indication of
the effects of LMET. Most important, however, is the more
difficult long-term external evaluation. Do LMET graduates
perform at significantly higher levels of leasership than non-
graduates? Does the LMET program have a measurable impact on
standard Navy indicators of leadership and management perform-
ance, as well as on newer indicators that will be developed as a
part of LMET itself? [WINTER, 1979, p. 12-13]
D. NEED FOR LMET EVALUATION
LMET will soon begin its fourth year with graduates continuing to be
dispersed throughout the entire Navy community, limited only by cost con-
serations and the shear numbers of quotas available annually. Plans to
continue LMET implementation on a more widespread basis are ongoing with
the full backing of the CNO. The implication is that LMET has become a
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solution, in great part, to the Navy's overall leadership and discipline
problem. Most people feel good about the direction of LMET and its
results, however, elaborations are few and comments are less than
specific.
Just how good is LMET? Is LMET producing the desired results or
changes? Unfortunately, those questions remain unanswered. It is diffi-
cult to identify what is meant by "improving" effectiveness. Efficiency
can usually be measured in terms of cost and time. Defining effective-
ness requires a detailed understanding of the variables that affect
performance.
Several prominent industrial psychologists express doubt
about the prospect of meaningful evaluations of methods like
McBer's. It is simply too difficult to identify the qualities
of good managers, they say, let alone measure their validity as
predictors of performance. [GOLEMAN , 1 98 1 , p . 46
]
Neither McBer nor its clients have so far produced much empirical
proof that their method does, in fact, lead to demonstrable improvements
in job performance. There are few published studies of the effectiveness
of comptenecy-based selection and training as practiced by McBer.
[GOLEMAN, 1981]
Much of McBer's work is too recent for meaningful evaluation. Ex-
cept for end of course critiques by students and informal comments by
commanding officers, LMET falls into this category.
However, the honeymoon for LMET is beginning to end. Researchers
are starting to question the McBer approach as unvalidated theory, ignor-
ing a host of pet factors, such as situational leadership or content
verses process leadership, to name only two. Some claim the data gather-
ing and analysis are not particularly impressive. Others insist that
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the sample size to base this magnitude of a program on was just too
small. [PARKER, 1980]
Additionally, there exists a very real need for all levels of Navy
managers to know the degree to which the LMET Program is effective.
Optimum use of scarce resources is a major concern to all managers, and
the LMET Program continues to make demands for both manpower and money
without proven justification. This concern should question whether the
ten days at LMET school is in fact improving individual effectiveness as
a leader, and hence worthwhile. If LMET is only a nice-to-know
management course, producing few measurable results, then there would be
a strong argument that those resources could be better allocated. On the
other hand, if LMET graduates are more effective leaders and managers in
directing the manpower resources available to them, then the program
should be valued. The bottom line is that Navy managers have a real need
for an LMET program evaluation to determine if the current level of
support is warranted.
An evaluation would also provide LMET program managers with feedback
as to its effectiveness. It would identify areas that require further
emphasis as well as identify deficiencies if they exist. The fact that
continued evaluation of the program is a stated goal [WINTER, 1979]
further highlights this need.
Perhaps more importantly, an evaluation can provide future direction
for the program. This aspect can keep the LMET program ahead of, or at
least, on top of emerging problems, thereby assuring it remains viable
and healthy. With this forward looking attitude the program can become
one of action vice reaction to the needs of the Navy.
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The list continues on and so does the need for LMET evaluation. As
with any program in times of austere funding, LMET will sooner or later
come under careful scrutiny as to its cost effectiveness. The Naval
Audit Service has already expressed an interest in examining LMET re-
sults. [PARKER, 1980] The Navy can little afford not to evaluate the
program.
As discussed at length above, the need for an evaluation of the LMET
program is quite clear. Yet, the question of how to conduct this evalua-
tion remains. How to best evaluate a system-wide program as extensive as
LMET within the Navy is not readily apparent. The number of proposed
methods would likely equal the number of people querried. System-wide
surveys, periodic graduate questionnaries, unit reports on overall
readiness vs number of graduates onboard, spot interviews, etc., are all
possible approaches to evaluation complete with strong arguments both for
and against their use.
In deciding on the issue of how best to evaluate, one should
consider what is being evaluated. LMET, as well as any program's
effectiveness, is not easily measured. There are few clear cut effect-
iveness indicators, no impeccable standards, and no completely reliable
method of measuring effectiveness as has been discussed earlier.
Another concern is the cost of any evaluation in terms of time,
manpower and money. All three constraints further confuse the issue of
how to best evaluate the LMET Program while optimizing these resources.
This research is intended to provide program managers and decision
makers with a practical method to answer the yery question of how. This
method of initial evaluation, in the form of a Pilot Study can test
hypotheses, evaluate a methodology, uncover relevant issues while
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providing data concerning the actual evaluation of a major program. This
thesis will attempt to demonstrate the value and usefulness of the Pilot
Study concept as related to a preliminary program evaluation.
It is under this context that this research on LMET effectiveness
was undertaken. The thrust of the work is twofold, first to try to shed
some light on LMET effectiveness. Second and possibly more important, to
demonstrate the practical value of a pilot study to help identify the
relevant issues, evaluate methodology, and test hypotheses prior to
committing extensive resources to a full scale evaluation.
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III. CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGN OF AN EVALUATION OF LMET
fcWIUbUNIS FOR a pilot sttjtty
A. RATIONALE FOR A PILOT STUDY
With the need for an evaluation firmly established, there remains at
least two critical questions to be answered; who is to conduct the study
and how? Let us briefly examine the who question first. There is
logical support for McBer and Company to evaluate the LMET Program, since
they are intimately familiar with its designed structure and theoretical
basis. However, there exists a possible conflict of interest whereby the
credibility of results could be in jeopardy. This in essence would be a
form of self-evaluation, open to criticism as being favorably biased,
regardless how fair or objective it was in reality.
CNET is another possible choice for conducting the evaluation. CNET
has familiarity with course content, teaching techniques, as well as easy
access to graduates both before and after the training. Again for many
similar reasons, the outcome of such an evaluation might be suspect. As
part of the Navy bureaucracy, CNET would be placed in an untenable
situation of evaluating a program that it administers. Any such
evaluation would probably be subject to close scrutiny, reguardless of
the actual quality. Clearly, there is a need for an independent
evaluation of the effectiveness of this program to insure a relatively
unbiased outcome.
This leads to a third alternative, that of an independent outside
contractor with no vested interest in the outcome. Yet even this alter-
native has considerable drawbacks. The cost of an evaluation would be
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high, especially for a contractor who is unfamiliar with the program. It
would be necessary for the contractor to expend a considerable amount of
time, manpower and money in studying the program prior to commencing the
evaluation. Even after that initial familiarization phase, there exists
a ^ery real possibility that the program could be misinterpreted,
resulting in an inappropriate direction for data collection. This could
result in an evaluation that uncovers nothing meaningful, or worse, mis-
evaluates the program, causing additional expenditures to correct non-
existant problems as well as creating the need for another evaluation.
The need for an evaluation by a knowledgable but independent third
party having no career-crucial or monetary interest in the outcome points
to yet another alternate approach. An independent contractor working
with only a sketchy concept of the program and little inside knowledge
may not be a good solution. However, if that same contractor were pro-
vided with some meaningful and concise direction for the evaluation, then
the study could be conducted more efficiently with the necessary credi-
bility. One method to provide this guidance is through a pilot study.
The pilot study, conducted by personnel knowledgable of the organization
and the program being evaluated, could identify issues, develop hypo-
theses, and even test an evaluation methodology. By conducting a pilot
study prior to the full-scale evaluation, information could be uncovered
that would provide the program manager and/or contractor with the needed
direction and relavent issues to effectively conduct a valid evaluation.
Manpower needs for such a pilot study are minimal with a variety of
possible sources such as CNET, HRMC's or, as in this case, Naval Post-
graduate students working on their master's degree thesis.
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It was with these thoughts in mind that a pilot study of the Navy's
LMET Program was undertaken by two Naval Postgraduate students. The
study commenced in mid-December 1980 and was completed in mid-June 1981,
a period of approximately six months.
B. EVALUATION DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Having decided who should conduct the pilot study, the remaining
question was how to evaluate the program and from there design the pilot
study. The ideal design would have been to establish a control group of
non-LMET graduates and compare their leadership/management practices with
LMET graduates to see if there were any recognizable differences. Then,
compare the non-LMET group with the LMET group to determine which command
was in fact, best managing those problem areas which LMET was intended to
alleviate. These would include areas such as drug and alcohol abuse,
retention, crew morale, unit readiness and material condition, and
command climate. Such an approach to evaluating a program would be very
scientific and lend itself in establishing the effectiveness of a parti-
cular program. The problem with implementing this approach is twofold.
First, no such control group was established when LMET was started. As a
result every command in the Navy has some LMET graduates on board.
Secondly, there is the problem of determining if a command's management
of those problem areas was in fact due to LMET training, some other
factor, or more likely, a combination of more than one factor.
Lack of a control group does not mean that a useful evaluation can
not be accomplished. It does, however, lend support to conducting a
pilot study in order to test an evaluation method prior to committing
45

scarce resources to a full scale evaluation. If unable to compare two
groups such as, LMET and non-LMET graduates, then the next logical step
is to compare individual performance before and after LMET training. By
collecting behavioral data on managers before LMET school and comparing
it to behavioral data gathered sometime after LMET school, changes in
leadership/managerial behavior could be detected. The implication is
that if the desired change is evident then the LMET training, hence the
program can be surmized as being effective. There is at least one con-
cern about this approach. That is, the LMET graduate needs to have had
sufficient time after completion of the training to have developed a
leadership/management behavior pattern. If conducted too soon after
graduation the result may well be a parroting of LMET training with no
real demonstrable behavioral changes. This need for a delay or time gap
between data gathering necessitates an evaluation that could be quite
lengthy in time.
While this time gap may suffice for a full scale evaluation, it
would, if used for a pilot study, create problems. By extending the
length of time to conduct a pilot study its usefulness to a program
manager is diminished. In a dynamic program such as LMET, an evaluation
needs to be as timely as possible in providing information. If the pilot
study is overly lengthy, the insights provided concerning program evalu-
ation may no longer be applicable when presented to the program manager.
If due to insufficient time, a before and after data gathering
approach is impractical, then another method must be employed, that of
the follow-up or post-test data collection. Using this method the intent
is to gather behavioral data after completion of the school to determine
if the students behavior matches that which the program is designed to
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produce. This follow-up or post-test method while the least rigorous of
those mentioned lends itself quite well to a pilot study. It can provide
sufficient data to identify issues, test hypotheses and evaluate a meth-
odology for conducting a full-scale evaluation. In addition, this
approach is not time constrained, is extremely flexible and easily adapt-
ed to the resources required for a pilot study. A drawback to this
approach is that data gathered from a student in a program, such as LMET,
may be highly opinionated and not necessarily indicative of actual
behavior, in essence only a self-report. This problem can be overcome by
validating the subjects' self-reported data with additional information
gathered from persons who have the opportunity to closely observe the
subjects' behaviors. Supervisors, subordinates and peers are all
potential sources of this validating data.
One additional consideration deals with sample size. A full-scale
evaluation in order to be considered valid needs to be a random sample of
the population. Such a random sample can then be assumed to statisti-
cally represent the whole population. When considering a major program,
such as LMET, this random sample may need to be quite large. A pilot
study, on the other hand, is not intended to be a substitute for a full-
scale evaluation and need not use a random sample inorder to be useful.
A sample that includes a cross section of affected people from the
program is all that is necessary. The intent is to not bias the pilot
study re- suits with data that applies to only a small segment or portion
of the program population. The sample size for a pilot study, when
possible, should provide a broad snapshot covering the entire spectrum of
the program under evaluation.
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C. GUIDELINES FOR AN LMET PILOT STUDY
The need for an evaluation of the LMET Program has been established.
Furthermore, the arguments in favor of conducting a pilot study in order
to provide guidance, as to how to conduct that evaluation have been pre-
sented. The remaining action is to formulate the guidelines necessary to
conduct the LMET Program pilot study.
The first concern was who should be included in the sample?
Obviously, in order to conduct this LMET pilot study, information needs
to be gathered on LMET school graduates as to behaviors they exhibit
after the LMET training. This then identified the study sample, LMET
gradu- ates. However, any data collected on the graduates which came
from the graduates themselves would need to be validated as discussed
earlier. This need for validating data also directed emphasis towards an
LMET graduates immediate supervisor and subordinate. The basic data
package would be gathered from LMET graduates, with validating data
gathered from their immediate supervisors and subordinates.
Ideally, a graduate who attended LMET school after arriving at his
present command would potentially provide the best behavioral change
data. Unfortunately graduates in this category were expected to be
difficult to find due to the programs scheduling. This scheduling
established the normal routine of attending LMET school via Permanent
Change of Station orders [PCS], that is before arriving at their command
and not via returnable-quota, Temporary Additional Duty orders [TAD]. As
a result of this procedure, most graduates would be expected to have




Another issue in this question of who to interview was, which
graduates? The LMET Program covers eight general management levels, they
are: CO/XO, Department Head, Division Officer, Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command, Leading Chief Petty Officer, Chief Petty Officer,
Leading Petty Officer and Petty Officer. These levels could be further
grouped into CO/XO, Department Head, Division Officer, Chief Petty
Officer and First Class Petty Officer which follows the normal Navy chain
of command. Among these groups the lower 3 levels of Division Officers,
Chief Petty Officers and First Class Petty Officers are the most numerous
aboard any command, hence most promising as to accessability, thereby
further defining the pilot study sample.
Limited interviewer resources as well as time constraints limited
the chance of obtaining what could even be remotely labeled a representa-
tive sample. However, it needs to be emphasized that this was not to be
an actual evaluation, but rather a pilot study. Therefore a non-random,
cross section of these LMET graduates would be sufficient. In this way
it would serve to evaluate methodology, identify key issues as well as
provide some crude insights into LMET effectiveness. What now became
important would be sampling a sufficient number of different commands as
well as a variety of billets within those commands. Since operational
commands had been given number one priority [0LMSTEAD,1980] for LMET
school quotas it was possible to further restrict the sample to these
commands. The most likely evidence of change would be among those
commands which had the highest degree of exposure to the LMET Program.
Due to the physical location of the Naval Postgraduate School on the
west coast, a practical consideration was qiven to concentrate on west
coast commands. Time was a major issue with travel costs providing an
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additional incentive to remain on the west coast. With the standardi-
zation of the LMET curriculum under CNET, it was felt that any general
conclusions reached using west coast commands would most likely apply to
east coast commands as well. With the geographic location narrowed down,
type of commands on which to concentrate [operational i.e., air, surface,
subsurface, amphibious, service force], and target billets identified
[Division Officer, CPO, P01] the remaining question was how large of a
sample would be necessary? The issue now became one of sampling a
sufficient number of different operational commands [air, surface,
submarine] as well as a variety of billets within those commands, within
the limited time available. The aim was to minimize any biases peculiar
to either type of command [surface, submarine, aviation]; billet
position such as Division Officer, Leading Petty Officer or Chief Petty
Officer; geographic location such as San Diego; or specialty area
[weapons, engineering, supply, etc.]. This cross-sectional sample would
be sufficient to draw conclusions and to provide certain guidance for a
future full-scale evaluation. It is imperative that the limitations of
this "non-random cross-sectional sample" be appreciated so as to prevent
this research from being mistaken as a program evaluation.
That leaves the remaining question of how to best gather the data.
The choice of methods focused on two possible methods, interviewing or
survey questionnaire. The collection of data, regardless of method, in-
volves three elementary forms of human activity: observation, partici-
pation and empathy. As best stated by R. L. Gorden:
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From these three activities all of the methods for study-
ing human behavior are derived. Within this framework, inter-
viewing is seen as one specific form of empathizing, partic-
ipating and observing which takes place between two people...
in this context the questionnaire [survey] is seen simply
as a technique for extending the interview in which the re-
searcher participates by constructing the questionnaire.
[G0RDEN,1980,p.5]
Empathy is referring to feelings with another person or understand-
ing how that person feels about something. Participation refers to doing
something with another person in their regular ongoing activities. When
taking on a participatory role one is in a vantage point from which it is
possible to either observe another's activity or to introspectively note
one's own thoughts and feelings as related to that situation. Observa-
tion includes any sensory perception, not only visual, of cues which help
a person understand human behavior. With these three concepts in mind
let us examine these two data gathering methodologies.
The first of the two methods is the survey questionnaire. Observer
participation in a survey with the respondent can only be dealt with
during the survey construction phase. Actual interaction between
observer and respondent is extremely limited. During the construction
phase it is possible to interject ones own thoughts as to what is
important, what needs to be asked or which issues are relevant. Once
constructed and administered, no further participation is available to
the "observer". This inflexibility is a major weakness of a survey
especially in a pilot study where the meaningful issues may not be known.
Observation for a survey consists of looking at and examining responses
written on the survey form. While perhaps easily quantifiable data may
be gathered, data that can be easily analyzed, using computer programs,
the observations are limited. The circumstance under which the answers
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were written, such as, the respondents emotional level, reaction to the
survey, workload and many other factors are lost to a survey administra-
tor. There is also the concern of whether each item asked on the survey
was fully understood by the respondent. Educational and cultural back-
ground, socio-economic considerations, as well as the environment all
have influence on the person participating in a survey. There is the
argument that this prevents the observer from biasing the data. Yet in
actuality the interviewers biases are permanently ingrained in the survey
itself with no way of adjusting to different respondents short of re-
writing the survey. By not viewing the respondent the interviewer looses
that personal aspect of data collection. Any empathy must be transmitted
via the survey instrument which is certainly difficult at best.
All this is not too say that a survey does not have distinct advan-
tages. A survey can be administered to a very large sample in a re-
latively short period of time at a low cost. It also lends itself well
to computer analysis. For data that is easily quantifiable into yes/no
responses or to scales of like/dislike, a survey is especially appro-
priate. However, when gathering data on a highly opinionated subject
where there are no obvious choices or a potentially wide variety of re-
sponses a survey can be useless.
Another consideration is that survey construction is an exacting
evolution. A good survey may take considerable time in constructing,
testing and revising. The problem is once administered it is difficult
to change so it must be correct the first time. It is this very in-
flexibility that limits the usefulness of a survey in conducting a pilot
52

study, especially for a program where the real issues may not yet be
known.
The second method considered was the interviewing process. One
obvious advantage to this method is the opportunity to gather data from
multiple sources. Not only are there the verbal responses of the re-
spondent but also non-verbal signals such as facial expressions, hand and
body motions and tone of voice to name only three. All of these obser-
vations can be used by the interviewer to gain a deeper insight into the
responses to the interview questions. This multiple observation capa-
bility can be enhanced by team interviewing, where one person questions
and concentrates on verbal responses, maximizing the flow of data while
the other person concentrates on note taking and non-verbal responses.
Participation in the interview is another advantage over surveys.
The observer is able to explore fully the responses given to questions by
solicitating further clarification or in asking additional questions.
This flexibility allows the interviewer to fully explore issues as they
surface while ensuring that it is completely understood. This specific
aspect fits the concept of a pilot study, especially the added flexi-
bility of exploring new issues.
Empathy can add to the quality of the data gathered via interview-
ing. The interviewer in being able to develop empathy for the respondent
during the course of an interview can anticipate probable reactions to
questions and sense how the respondents feel about the events they are
relating. This can add a qualitative aspect to what is actually being
stated thereby further enriching the data.
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All of this is not to say that interviewing does not have drawbacks.
It is a time consuming process and costly in terms of money and manhours
expended. There is a wery real danger of the interviewers distorting the
data with their own biases, perhaps unknowingly. Additionally, it takes
a certain skill to establish a good rapport with the respondent. Without
it, a free flow of information is not possible.
The very flexibility of the interview poses another problem in that
it is ^ery easy to get sidetracked into irrelevant issues or redundant
detail to a response. The interviewing procedure is dependent on the
free flow of information between respondent and the interviewer.
The interview process itself can inhibit this yery flow of inform-
ation. Interviewing with two interviewers on one respondent may infact
be intimidating to the respondent. If a tape recorder is used to record
the verbal data it may similarly intimidate the respondent.
An additional obstacle may be that of the actual person, officer or
civilian, used in conducting the interview, especially for enlisted re-
spondents discussing their supervisors. The Navy officer may have an
advantage of being an insider to the organization, who understands the
language and jargon and can probably empathize easily with the respon-
dent. If in uniform he will present a familiar, possibly non-
threatening appearance due to the respondents everyday interface with
officers. A civilian on the other hand may hinder the flow of
communication by having to have everyday situations and acronyms explain-
ed. There is also the possibility of misunderstanding a word or phrase
that is Navy jargon.
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On the other hand the civilian interviewers may be less threatening
in that they do not represent members of hiqher Navy management. For the
Navy respondent, there may be less reluctance to voice a negative opinion
about a Navy program to an outsider of the organization.
D. SUMMARY
These preceding considerations and issues concerning a pilot study
for a major program, such as LMET, form the preliminary step in its
overall evaluation process. While not all encompassing, each of these
specific issues were addressed in formulating an LMET pilot study design.
Any major program requiring evaluation could use this or a similar
approach in order to develop an appropriate direction for a full scale
evaluation. The pilot study design can provide decision makers with the
relevant issues and guidance to better optimize their resources.
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IV. LMET PILOT STUDY DESIGN: A DESCRIPTION
A. PREPARATION
As in any research study, a pilot study being no exception, a plan
of attack must be developed before one packs his bags and heads out to
gather "data". The question of what one wants or seeks to find, should
be clearly established from the start. Without this being established
it is difficult, if not impossible, to best determine the course of
action to take. Once the problem identification and statement is
complete, a methodology and overall design strategy for the study can
be formulated.
An overall evaluation of LMET effectiveness would serve nicely as
a problem statement for the proposed research. After all, the LMET
Program had not been evaluated and effectiveness as related to im-
proved student performance could provide a suitable criteria for
measurement purposes. However, this was not to be the case for at
least two major reasons, that of a time constraint and previously noted
difficulties in measuring effectiveness.
First, the two graduate students selected would have only 6 months
to complete the study, from December through June. While sufficient
time to commence an evaluation presented no major problems through June,
both were scheduled to graduate at that time and would subsequently re-
ceive seperate Navy orders based upon service needs. Since no other
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graduate student assets were available with sufficient background
experience and time to conduct the evaluation it was agreed to conduct
a pilot level study rather than a major overall evaluation of LMET
effectiveness.
The second area of concern centered around the notion of effec,
tiveness. Previous effectiveness studies, especially in the area of
leadership training, in both the civilian and military sectors are few
in number, yielding inconclusive results as a whole. It has been
difficult at best to measure situational performance of personnel, let
alone attempt to measure an improvement or increase in this performance
and relate that to a specific training program to determine its overall
effectiveness. The difficulty in determining effectiveness would only
be compounded by the aforementioned insufficient time. The probability
of obtaining an outcome would be low and any results obtained would
lack credibil ity.
For these very reasons among others it was decided to conduct a
smaller scale pilot study using interview techniques to gather data.
The hope of the study would be to obtain useful data on LMET effect,
iveness to better design a much larger overall LMET evaluation.
B. A PLAN DEVELOPES
In December 1980, a recommended study design was received from
McBer and Company based upon the pilot level study concept. 5 McBer
5 In the letter McBer and Company reiterated support for
efforts to conduct an LMET evaluation. [McBER AND COMPANY, 1981]
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recommended the strategy of a combination of open.ended interview
questions with a survey instrument to be completed by the respondent
immediately after each interview. Interviews were to be conducted with
LMET graduates, two of their subordinates and an immediate super,
visor. Suggested sample questions to be asked for each level
[graduate, subordinate and supervisor] were included from McBer. The
questions were designed to concentrate on behaviors [has their behavior
changed?] and results [does it make any difference to bottom line
measures?], rather than reactions [how do people like the course?] and
knowledge
-
content [what did they learn?]. 6 In this way, the in
depth interviews probing for specific, behavioral examples from the
LMET graduates could be validated by their subordinates and supervisor
in an effort to obtain more meaningful data. McBer also mentioned a
suggested coding scheme for the interview data which had been used to
evaluate their own business leadership training program. McBer
recommended that the graduate students be trained in interview skills
as well as an LMET coding scheme for scoring interview responses. Their
final recommendation was to send both researchers through the LMET
course itself, before conducting the study.
Through December and January the pilot study preparations
continued. During this pre. interview phase the major task would be to
6McBer states, "...'Reactions' are best addressed immedi-
ately after the course [which is indeed happening] and 'knowledge ,
content' is currently being evaluated immediately after the course in
response to requests from CNET."
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improve interview techniques of the two graduate students as well as to
develop a knowledgeable background on LMET and general Navy leadership
training .
In the area of interview techniques, the graduate students relied
on a variety of sources to further develop their skills. Both graduate
students were surface warfare, line lieutentant commander with
similar experience in management practices developed in at_sea opera-
tional environments for a combined total of nearly 20 years in the
Navy. Additionally, both were pursuing Master of Science degrees in
Management, specifically Human Resource Management [HRM] with an
emphasis in Organizational Development [O.D.] 7 . Their experience as
Naval officers as well as their knowledge of applied and theoretical
concepts of management would serve as a substantial foundation in
developing interviewing skills.
Prior to interviewing both graduate students attempted a 2 day
workshop conducted by Captain Phillip Butler, USN, on interviewing.
8
The workshop concentrated on developing and planning an overall
interview strategy. Stressing the biases of this form of social
?The Human Resource Management curriculum at the Naval Post,
graduate School consists of core courses in Economics, Operations
Research, Systems Analysis, Management, Accounting, Computers and
Statistics followed by sub speciality courses in Organizational Theory,
Educational Design, Labor Relations and Personnel Management,
Organizational Development, Individual and Group Processes as well as
Public Administration.
^Captain Butler holds a Doctorate in Sociology from the
University of California, San Diego. He is well known for his active
use of interviewing as a viable means of gathering data in both




inquiry, he introduced specific interview methods and skills available
as well as thoughts on their effective use. At the conclusion of the
workshop participants were given the opportunity to team interview on a
variety of subjects with subsequent feedback on their effectiveness.
Using the concepts developed from this workshop, actual interviews were
conducted for practical experience. 9 The next area of concern was
now turned towards the LMET concept and the actual course. Research on
the development of Navy leadership training, Dr. McClel land's concepts
of achievement and competency notions, McBer's LMET study, and course
content of LMET [all previously mentioned], were undertaken to formu-
late a satisfactory base of knowledge. While there was no time to
actually attend the LMET course due to other graduate course require,
ments, a trip was made to the LMET School in Coronado, California.
During that visit both graduate students were allowed to sit in on the
various levels of classes as well as talk to the curriculum director
and a number of LMET instructors. Literature on course content, sample
course schedules as well as general LMET information was obtained and
later reviewed. In mid January, the research background on LMET as
well as the interview training was completed, a meaningful plan of
attack could now be developed complete with a schedule of milestones.
9LCDR D. Vandover, one of the two pilot study researchers,
using interview concepts from CAPT Butler's workshop as well as
additional research, designed and conducted a 1 day interview workshop
which was given to a class of graduate students at the Naval
Postgraduate School. Later both students received practical training
in conducting interviews while involved in consulting with a local
business in Monterey, California. These interviews were conducted with
eighteen owners/ employees with wide educational backgrounds, and




A plan to conduct the pilot study was proposed to and approved by
Dr. Reuben Harris. Interviews were to commence later in January and
continue through the end of March, with the hope of obtaining at least
20 sets of interviews. April was to be set aside to analyze the data
while May was to be used to write the final report. The major sections
of McBers recommended pilot study design, including the questions, 10
would be utilized with three exceptions: first, the survey after the
interview would not be used. Next, McBer's coding scheme for the
interview data would not specifically be employed, thereby eliminating
this additional training requirement; and finally, the graduate
students would not attend the ten day LMET course.
Dr. Harris obtained a point of contact to assist the graduate
students in scheduling the commands to be interviewed using the Human
Resources Management Center [HRMC] in San Diego, California, and the
Human Resources Management Detachment [HRMD] in Alameda, California,
for the commands in those areas respectively. It was left up to the
graduate students to contact the center and detachment to work out the
final details. Additionally, the cognizant officer on the staff of the
A list of the actual questions used during the study is
contained in Appendix A.
All three design recommendations appeared to be good
suggestions, however, the report was not received until mid January.
This left insufficient time to fully develop a survey, arrange for
additional training in McBer's coding scheme and attend two weeks of
LMET school. In addition, due to the small sample size, it was felt
that the survey would provide little additional insight to this
particular study. All three recommendations deserve thoughtful
consideration as part of a large scale evaluation.
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Commander, Pacific Fleet, [CINCPACFLT], was notified of details
concerning the study. The types of commands and levels of LMET gradu-
ates to be interviewed were not specified and were left to the judge-
ent of the graduate students.
It was decided by the graduate students to try to interview a
wide-ranging sample of operational [as opposed to shore and support]
commands in terms of warfare specialties; that is air, submarine and
surface, with emphasis on the latter due to their familiarity and
experience. Since the emphasis would be on surface ships the sample
would be further divided into carriers, cruisers and destroyers,
amphibious, auxiliary support and miscellaneous. Each of the three
major Pacific Fleet geographical areas would be sampled, San Diego,
California; Alameda, California; and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Among the
selected commands, it was decided to interview LMET graduates in three
specific billet levels, each corresponding to LMET levels of petty
officer [E-6], chief petty officer [E-7 thru E-9], and division
officer [0-1 thru 0-4]. Department head graduates as well as executive
and commanding officers would not be interviewed, except as immediate
supervisors to the LMET graduates. On January 29, 1981, the first in-
terviews for the pilot study were conducted onboard a surface ship in
Alameda, California. Nearly two months later the last interview would
be completed onboard another surface ship in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Actual selection of the commands to be interviewed was left to the
discretion of the HRMC and HRMD. The only guidance given was that the
wider the variety of operational commands the better. Undoubted a major
consideration was which commands were inport. Any other criteria that
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the HRMC/O considered in selecting commands is not known, however,
there remains a possibility that other selection criteria may have been
used and may affect the data.
One to two weeks prior to the interviews the point of contact in
the desired area was called and asked to nominate or identify a command
for each of the two days the interviewers were planning to be in the
area. Once the commands had been identified, [points of contact at the
command and telephone numbers were supplied by the HRMC and HRMD], the
interviewers would contact the command, usually through the executive
officer, to explain the proposed visit and confirm a date and the
commands actual location. This selection procedure continued smoothly
throughout the interview phase with relatively few problems. It was
easy to tell if the HRMC or HRMD had actually contacted the units or
just identified them based upon an employment schedule, commands
personally contacted by the HRMC and HRMD were far more enthusiastic
about the proposed visit than were those not contacted. While a
considerable amount of extra time was necessary to "convince and sell
the visit" to unaware commands, no one ever refused to visit.
The initial telephone contact with the commands by the
interviewers generally lasted 15-30 minutes. This was a sufficient
length of time to explain the specific details of the visit. The visit
was explained as a study on LMET effectiveness for the specific purpose
of completing a Masters Thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School. Upon
realizing that the interviewers were Navy surface warfare officers,
instant credibility seemed to be established, resulting in an informal,
open door policy for the visit. One executive officer remarked, "Hey,
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anything you guys need.
. . .it' s good to see the Navy using its own like
this." The executive officers were informed of the desire to interview
3-5 LMET graduates [within the three levels previously discussed],
along with their immediate supervisor and two subordinates. 12 They
were told that the interviews for the LMET graduates would last
approximately one hour, while subordinate and immediate supervisor
interviews would only take a total of 30 minutes.13 Initially, the
executive officers were allowed to set up their own schedule for the
days interviewing. However, as the study progressed a schedule
developed by one of the commands became the recommended example that
executive officers were encouraged to follow. 14 The only
requirements stipulated by the interviewers was the need for two
separate spaces or rooms [relatively quiet if possible], which would be
used to actually conduct the interviews. The executive officer was
then informed of the interviewers desires to wear civilian clothes as
part of the study, when applicable, no one refused.
Actual selection of the LMET graduates at each command was left to
the discretion of the executive officer. It is not known how the
selection process actually occurred in each instance, however, it is
known that some graduates volunteered while others "were volunteered"
1 ?ie
-^fter interviewing at several commands the two subordinate
requirement was changed to include only one immediate subordinate.
This resulted in a time savings.
1 ?1J McBer had suggested 1.5 hours for LMET graduates and 45 minutes
for subordinates and supervisors. As the study progressed, actual
interview times for LMET graduates rarely lasted 60 minutes, with sub
ordinate and supervisor interviews easily completed within 15 minutes.
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to participate. The executive officer was not requested to specifical-
ly nominate certain levels of individuals since the totals among the
three levels remained fairly equal throughout the entire study.
Several days prior to the actual visit the commands were again
contacted to remind them of the time and date of the visit as well as
to recheck the actual location of the ship. While problems were few
and far between, they were all resolved during this final contact. On
one occasion, a forced cancellation by a command was required due to an
upcoming inspection. Using personal contacts by the interviewers,
another command was substituted causing no problems.
All interview visits except one were scheduled during the normal
work week, with the vast majority occurring on Thursdays and Fridays.
While the weekends were certainly more convenient to the interviewers
due to graduate course studies, they were incredibly inconvenient for
the commands for obvious reasons. The one exception occurred through
special arrangement over a weekend after it was learned that a
satisfactory sample [five graduates, supervisors, and subordinates],
could be obtained within the duty sections over a two day period.
Arrival at the commands on the day of the interviewing was usually
between 0745-0815. Although the individual commands generally start
their work day earlier, it was felt that it would be more convenient
and less hectic to arrive after officer's call, giving the executive
officer as well as the ship a chance to start their day before our
intrusion - the commands agreed unanimously. On every occasion the
quarterdeck watch had expected the arrival and the interviewers were
taken to the executive officer. After introductions and the
66

interviewing plan had been discussed the executive officer would
typically ask, "..So what have you found out about LMET that we should
know?" On several occasions the interviewers were asked to meet the
commanding officer where he also expressed an interest in learning what
had been found to date.
D. THE INTERVIEW PROCESS
Interviews were first conducted with the LMET graduates using
both interviewers. One interviewer would question the respondent while
the other interviewer would passively take notes as well as handle the
tape recorder. The respondent was introduced to the interviewers and
made to feel relaxed. He was told specifically about the study and
assured of confidentiality concerning his responses. He was told
that if he was to be quoted there would be absolutely no mention of
either his name or his command. His permission was solicited to allow
the use of the tape recorder during the interview. Without exception,
permission was always received, allowing for a complete taping of all
interviews. He was further asked not to mention any names of
individuals during the interview.
15
Commanding officers and executive officers of the commands
interviewed were generally interested in any information concerning
LMET. The interviewers were careful to avoid any evaluative remarks
under the guise that it would not be known until all interviews had
been completed with the data analyzed.
All 51 interviewed LMET graduates were male except in one
exception a female division officer. The use of the masculine pronoun
throughout the research denotes the entire sample including this
exception.
"All tapes contain an interview number as well as the commands
name. Respondents are identified only as to their LMET level [petty
officer, chief petty officer or officer] as well as their relationship
[graduate, subordinate or supervisor].
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The graduates were all asked the 17 questions [Appendix A] origin.
1
8
ally recommended by McBer. Additionally, they were asked the
following four questions:
1. How long ago did you graduate from LMET school?
2. Did you attend LMET school prior to arriving at this
command?
3. Would you send anyone to LMET school? Why?
4. Is there anything else you would like to tell us con-
concerning LMET?
The interviews with the graduates proceeded smoothly. The only
minor problem was a confusion between LMT and LMET. Seven respondents
identified by their commands as LMET graduates had actually attended
LMT school. These interviews were not included in the study results
reported and were terminated as soon as this fact was uncovered.
Interviews with the graduates immediate subordinate and supervisor
were conducted after the graduate's interview, usually later that
afternoon. In this way they could be used to validate the graduates
remarks. Interviews were conducted by a single interviewer, with two
interviews ongoing simultaneously in separate rooms. Identical intro-
ductions were made as had been done with the LMET graduates.
Confidentiality was promised and respondents were asked to omit names
using only "him" or "he" to identify the graduate. Permission was
obtained in every case to record the interviews on tape.
l^in some instances several LMET stimulus questions were
specifically omitted if the interviewers believed they had already been
answered in discussing previous questions.
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The subordinates as well as the supervisors were all asked the
four questions recommended by McBer. Additionally, they were asked the
following four questions [note the difference in questions 2 and 3
depending upon the respondent]:
[Both] 1. What do you like or admire most about his [the
graduates] performance onboard?
[Subordinate] 2. a Would you work for him again? Why?
[Supervisor] 2.b Would you work for him [if roles were reversed]?
Why?
[Subordinate] 3. a Would you like to go to LMET school? Why?19
[Supervisor] 3.b Would you send anyone to LMET school? Why?
[Both] 4. Is there anything else you would like to say
concerning this individual or LMET school?
In some of the earlier interviews with these individuals it was
noted that they did not proceed as smoothly as had the graduates inter-
views. There was a tendency on the subordinates part to remain intro-
verted and to assume that the interviewers were trying to personally
grade or evaluate the graduate. Their perception seemed to be that
their information could have detrimental consequences on either them-
selves or the LMET graduate. Once this was noticed, early in the study,
an effort was made prior to the interview to explain to them that the
information they would give would be used only to categorize the LMET
graduate among other LMET graduates. Interviews with supervisors
proceeded smoothly with no problems.
19 If it was found that the subordinate had gone to LMET school,
then question 3.b. was substituted.
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At the conclusion of the day, after all interviews had been
completed, the interviewers then met to discuss the days events.
Preparations for the next interviews were begun using any new lessons
learned from that days activities.
The interview process as discussed above was repeated through
March in a fairly methodical fashion. In the end, the pilot study
sample size consisted of 51 LMET graduate interviews evenly divided
among the three junior levels of LMET training [LPO, CPO and DO]. The
sample represented 13 operational commands within the 3 warfare areas
in three Pacific Fleet geographical locations. 20
During the next four weeks the tedious process of analyzing the
data was undertaken. Responses to each question were carefully
analyzed using the notes and tapes taken during the interviews. All
data was team analyzed using both students rather than each separately
analyzing the data twice. A coding scheme was developed for each
question prior to analyzing the data, in an attempt to categorize the
data into a somewhat more usable format. Although extremely time
consuming, the interviews analyzed using the LMET [McBER] competencies
produced an enormous amount of information concerning both the LMET
program in general as well as specifics on LMET graduates.





I. BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE BY COMMAND LOCATION
Type of Graduate I nterviewer'
s
Command Location Rate/Rank Appearance
Service Force Ship [AFS] Al ameda SK1/ENS/BM1/RM1 Civilian*
Amphibious Ship [LPD] Alameda LTJG/ET1/ENS/SKC Civilian
Nuclear Submarine [SSN] San Diego RMC/ST1/IC1/MMC/ETCS Civilian
Small Craft Unit San Diego BMC/SK1/BM1/HM1/ENCS Civilian
Service Force Ship [AOR] Alameda MSC/RMC/EMC/LTJG/HTC Un i form
Service Force Ship [AFS] Alameda ENS/DP1/QMCS/RMC Uniform
Submarine Rescue Ship [ASR] San Diego LT/ENCS/EN1 Un i form
Aviation Squadron [RVAW] San Diego LT/LCDR/LT/ENS Uniform
Aircraft Carrier [CV] Al ameda MM1/ENS/AG1 Uniform
Tender [AR] San Diego BM1/HTC/ET1/BM1/HTC Uniform
Destroyer [DO] San Diego DS1/GMG1/0SC/GSEC/ENS Civil ian
Fast Frigate [FF] Pearl Harbor ENS/ENS Uniform
Cruiser [CG] Pearl Harbor ENS/LT Un i form
^3 interviews in civilian clothes, 28 in uniforms
II. BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE BY PAYGRADE
Paygrade of LMET Graduate E6 E7 E8 E9 01 02 03 04
(Rank) P01 CPO SCPO MCPO ENS LTJG LT LCDR
TOTALS 18 13 4 9 2 4 1
LMET Level of Graduate E6 E7.E9






III. BREAKDOWN BY WARFARE SPECIALTY/RATE
11 Surface Warfare Officers
1 Supply Corp Officer
3 Aviation Officers
1 Aviation Maintenance Officer




1 HM 5 BM's
1 ST
1 GM













IV. BREAKDOWN BY TIME SINCE GRADUATION FROM LMET SCHOOL
Officer CPO P01
Less then 6 mo. 4 6 9 19 [37.3%]
6-12 mos. 5 7 3 15 [29.4%]
1.2 years 7 4 4 15 [29.4%]




V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The data gathered from the pilot study can be grouped into two
broad areas. First is the data indirectly gathered through observing
and participating in the interview process
, that is, information on and
resulting from the methodology used. Second is the actual content of
the interviews, that is, data concerning the LMET graduate to the LMET
Program. These data findings can be used to judge the value of the
pilot study technique as a preliminary evaluation plan for major
program, specifically LMET in this case, prior to committing extensive
resources towards a full-scale evaluation.
A. INTERVIEW ANALYSIS
Before discussing actual interview content and LMET findings, let
us look first at the process used to specifically gather this
information. There exists many advantages as well as disadvantages
[discussed earlier], in using interviews to gather data. The quality
of data [both in depth and range] obtained from interviews is normally
offset by the amount of time required in using this method. Once the
interview method has been examined in relation to this study, the LMET
content findings will be presented.
1 . Interviewing: A Time Consuming Process
The interviewing process was extremely time consuming, sub.
stantiating previous research claims to this fact. Each LMET graduate
was team interviewed for approximately 45 minutes by an active and
passive observer for a total expenditure of 2.25 man. hours. Each,
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immediate subordinate and supervisor to the LMET graduate was inter-
viewed for approximately 15 minutes, one, on, one for a total expenditure
of 1.0 man.hour. A simple arithmetic computation reveals that 3.25
man-hours were expended per LMET graduate set of interviews.
Theoretically, this times the 51 interview sets equals a total of
165.75 man-hours. In actuality, due to interviews lasting longer than
45 minutes, approximately 180 man-hours were expended in data
collection. This only accounts for actual time expended in
interviewing and does not include any travel, or set-up time for the
interviewers nor time spent arranging for the interviews. It is worthy
to mention that considerable time and travel money was conserved
through interviewing several graduates per command [3 to 6 graduates
with 5 the ideal number for 1 day].^
This lengthy expenditure of time in having the respondents
full attention was a primary advantage in obtaining a wide range and
depth of information. It allowed ample opportunity to exploit the
respondents' desire to voice their own feelings concerning the LMET
training, as well as specifically, how LMET was seen to be emphasized
at that command. Those respondents that were extremists towards the
training were quick to point out its weaknesses or strengths while
those that were neutral presented a more toned down version. The end
result was a good overall picture of how LMET graduates behaved and
felt about their training within the sample.
^A sample interview schedule is contained in Table 2.
74

2. In Depth Process Analysis: The LMET Interview
This section contains general remarks on the LMET interview
process followed by examining five specific areas concerning: interview
flexibility, the interview schedule, the interview environment, the
issue of military vs civilian interviewers, and finally comments
concerning interview introduction. The data consists of 69.25 hours of
taped conversation in a leading question, free answer format. As such,
the information is considered to be soft. data, in that it is difficult
to quantify. Often it was seen that two people can use very similar
terms to describe the same subject yet mean \/ery different ideas. Non-
verbalized expressions such as tone of voice, hand and body movements,
and facial expressions served to emphasize points and at times
contradict what was actually being stated. This caused the interviewer
to explore deeper while taking written notes concerning the
respondent's attitude and behavior. This resulted in data consisting
of not only the taped conversations, but also the notes and feelings of
the interviewers. Even after 51 interviews it was still possible to
vividly remember each respondent and their general attitude while
listening to the tapes as much as four months after the interview. In
addition to the interview questions, the respondent was given the
opportunity to make any additional comments that might be pertinent or
of felt importance. This resulted in a sizable amount of not easily
catagoried responses that added to the total information obtained.
The subjectiveness of this soft data was further accented by
the interviewer's own biases towards the LMET Program. This bias tend-
ed to cause an interviewer to probe deeper into certain areas where the
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respondent was reinforcing the biases of the interviewer and perhaps
cutting off or playing down other those in opposition. As the
interviewing progressed, the interviewers started to observe what were
thought to be trends and may have tended to guide respondents into
confirming those ideas or trends. Oppossing these tendencies were the
interviewer's knowledge of their own biases and a professional interest
in suppressing them as much as possible,
a. Interview Flexibility
One of the early advantages that became apparent in using
the interview, as opposed to a survey, was its flexibility in gathering
data. The interviewer was able to control the direction of the infor.
mation flow through questions and requests for clarification of
statements. It quickly became obvious that the interview questions had
a natural progression that made asking some unnecessary as the answer
would be given in discussing a previous question. This resulted in
rearranging the questions in this natural order and merely encourag-
ing the respondent to continue until all of the desired data had been
obtained. In not breaking the respondent's train of thought, the
interviewing process progressed smoothly and quickly, allowing ample
opportunity for the respondents to voice their thoughts on any given
topic or question. While this did allow for the respondent to answer




The opportunity of interaction between interviewer and
respondent ensured that the interviewer was correctly interpreting re.
sponses. In rephasing further questions, and asking for clarification
of specific responses, the interviewer had ample opportunity to clear
up any misconceptions or hazy areas identified by the respondent during
the interview. Similarly a distinct advantage of the interview was the
ability to rephase questions to ensure the respondent understood what
was being asked. This exchange of ideas led to the rewriting of
several questions that were ambiguous or unclear as to what they were
asking. It was discovered that what seemed to be a perfectly clear
question to either interviewer was often not understood by a respondent
of a different educational or cultural background.
As a final note on this subject, the ^ery flexibility of
the interview process required the undivided attention of the
interviewer. This results in a tendency of the interviewer to "burn
out" after several consecutive days of interviewing. The interviews
were conducted weekly over a two day period, normally a Thursday and
Friday. If a full five days of interviewing were conducted there may
have been a difficulty for interviewers to maintain their interest and
enthusiasm for the project. The consequence is obviously a risk of
gathering lower quality data at the end of a week as compared to the
beginning.
b. Interview Schedule
An interviewing schedule was developed and used soon after
the data gathering phase had begun. For the first two commands no
schedule was provided, only a description of what was necessary,
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namely to interview four to six LMET graduates as well as an immediate
subordinate and supervisor for each. The first command devised and
promulgated a schedule [as well as a Plan of the Day [POD] note], that
worked so well [see Table 2] that it was recommended for use to all
subsequent commands. The use of this standardized schedule allowed the
interviewers to develop a routine that minimized wasted time, and
increased efficiency in conducting the interviews. Additionally, most
command XOs appeared grateful to receive a schedule format in which
they could merely insert names. It reduced the administrative burden
to the commands as well as completely satisfying the interviewer's
needs. The sample schedule also minimized disruptions for their crew
by promulgating beforehand, an interview schedule complete with inter-
view location and time.
The schedule that was developed by the first command had
all of the LMET graduates interviewed first, in the morning, followed
by their supervisors and subordinates in the afternoon. The outcome
could not have been better planned. Through interviewing all of the
LMET graduates first, the interviewers formed a crude idea of the
command's attitude towards the LMET Program. It also allowed the
interviewers to categorize each LMET graduate as to their degree of
adoption to the LMET competencies. Seldom did the LMET graduate
interviews exceed the allotted 60 minutes which allowed the inter-
viewers [active and passive] to quickly exchange impressions on each
interview while still fresh in their minds.
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The most beneficial aspect of interviewing the LMET
graduate first was the detailed data on behavior gained, which could
later be validated by their supervisor and subordinate. In a few
cases, when the supervisor or subordinate was interviewed first, only
general responses could be solicited in the hope that they would in
fact substantiate what the graduate would say. The interviewing
process operated best as a validation of behavior when conducted in the
order of LMET graduate, then either subordinate or supervisor.
c. Interview Environment
All interviews for this pilot study were conducted either
onboard the unit or working spaces and areas under the direct control
of the command. This kept the respondent on familiar ground, in what
could be termed as "home territory". However, whenever possible a
neutral zone or area was used in order to remove any feelings of "big
brother watching you". For enlisted personnel this seemed to mean any
space where officers did not have ready access and included such areas
as unoccupied officer staterooms, unit commander's offices [unit
commander not embarked], and recreation rooms or librarys. In one
instance the wardroom was used with obvious detremental effects.
Enlisted respondents appeared to be uneasy and nervous, and stopped
talking to look and see who entered every time the door opened. For
officer personnel, any place appeared to be sufficient. In remaining
onboard the command while conducting the interviews it appeared to be
less disruptive and more likely for personnel to respond promptly to
the promulgated time schedule. In fact, throughout the study, inter-
viewers seldom had to wait more than a few minutes and respondents
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seldom had any wait at all. The smoothness with which the schedule
operated was in no small part responsible for the large number of
interviews that were able to be conducted.
All interviews were tape recorded instead of depending
entirely on written notes. The reason for the use of the tape recorder
and the confidentiality of the interview were carefully explained to
the respondent prior to each interview. After obtaining the respond-
ent's permission to tape the interview an identification statement was
made on the tape. The statement specifically did not include the
respondent's name or rate to reverify the confidentiality that had been
promised. With this formality over, the interview proceeded with
little or no attention placed on the tape recorder. It did not appear
to inhibit any person from expressing their opinions. The tape re-
corder could be slightly disruptive however, if a tape ended in the
middle of an interview. The respondent would normally stop talking
until a new tape was started even when the interviewer insisted that he
continue and not worry about the tape.
Maintaining the neutrality of the interviewing environment
is extremely important as was demonstrated during the course of two
interviews in which the supervisor was nearby. In one instance, the
supervisor was at his desk on the other side of an equipment rack, and
in the other, he was actually being interviewed simultaneously across
the room. In both instances, the respondent's reactions were very
similar. The respondents appeared to be nervous and continuously
glanced in the direction of their supervisor. One respondent's replies
to questions seemed to be for the benefit of his supervisor. The
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respondents seemed to realize that the confidentiality of what was
being said could not be guaranteed under these circumstances,
d. Interviewer
. Military vs Civilian
Concerning the issue of military versus civilian inter-
viewers, a couple of points are of note. In 23 interview sets civilian
clothes instead of military uniforms were worn to see if that had any
effect upon responses. It appeared to the interviews that the wearing
of uniforms was optimal over civilian clothes. Instant establishment
of credibility as a person knowledgeable in Navy matters exsisted when
wearing a uniform that seemed to increase the information flow. When
civilian clothes were worn there was a noticed tendency for the
respondent to explain routine procedures, Navy acronyms, and common
programs, that were not done when interviewing in uniform. In both
cases, using familiar vocabulary and Navy jargon greatly assisted in
conducting the interviewing process. Additionally, a feeling of
empathy for each others positon was quickly established when in
uniform. The rank and age of the interviewers also seemed to
facilitate the entire process. Lieutenant or lieutenant commander is
sufficiently senior to develop good rapport with senior petty officers
and chief petty officers, while a fairly youthful appearance [age
30-31, one interviewer with a beard] reduced the "generation gap" that
might have inhibited discussion with younger officers and enlisted
personnel. The fact that enlisted personnel are quite used to
interfacing with officers but not with civilians in an official
capacity probably had a positive impact on interviewing in uniform.
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e. Need for Interview Introduction
A final issue that surfaced during the interviewing
process was that of the purpose. Some subordinates seemed reluctant to
talk about their supervisor despite assurances of confidentiality. At
one point an interview was briefly stopped and it was explained care-
fully to the respondent that the intent of the questions and study was
not to evaluate his supervisor's performance in itself, but rather to
evaluate a program of leadership/management techniques. With these
assurances the interview resummed in a much more relaxed and co-opera-
tive atmosphere. After this incident, subordinate interviews were
begun by including this performance concept as part of the overall
interview introduction with good results.
3. Interview Remarks
The interview process provided an excellent method for
gathering data from the respondents. Primarily through its flexibil-
ity, the researchers were afforded the opportunity to explore relevant
areas of interest as well as uncover tangential issues of concern.
Concluding interview remarks concerning a future full-scale evaluation
are contained in the next chapter. The remainder of this chapter
concerns the specific LMET content information derived from the
interviews themselves.
B. FINDINGS CONCERNING LMET
The findings of this study concerning LMET must be viewed with
full recognition of the limitations of the sample. The sample in-
cluded only 51 LMET graduates selected from 13 operational commands in
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three west coast geographical areas. Furthermore, the sample was not
random and therefore cannot be said or alluded to be truly representa-
tive of the Navy. However, the sample did contain a wide variety of
warfare specialties, ranks, rates and operational commands, and does
provide a good insight to LMET's influence, particularly on the sample
population.
The method of describing the LMET findings which will be addressed
in this analysis is using the Kilpatrick paradigm consisting of four
levels or domains of learning. These levels are:
1. Reactions [How do people like the course?]
2. Knowledge-content [What did they learn?]
3. Behavior [Has their behavior changed?]
4. Results [Does it make any difference to bottom line
measures?] [McBER,1981]
The level of "reaction" is the subjective opinion of the LMET graduate
towards the overall course usefulness. This data can be gathered at
any time, but is probably best addressed immediately after the course
[this is done via a feedback survey completed upon completion of LMET
training]. "Knowledge-content" concerns the level of retaining
information, ideas and concepts. It also is best measured immediately
upon completion of the LMET training [which is occurring in response to
CNET requests]. "Behavior" is the level in which the instruction is
actually practiced on the job by the LMET graduate. This is the level
in which the pilot study interview method was focused upon in
attempting to measure LMET effectiveness. The final area of "results"
concerns that level where the changed behavior of the LMET graduate
does in fact bring about the changes within the system which are de-
sired. This is in the realm of a cause and effect relationship and




The first of the four levels to be examined is that of
reactions. While it was not the intent of the study to explore this
level, responses were obtained that provide some insight into the LMET
graduate's "reactions" to their training.
a. LMET Viewed as Necessary
When querried as to whether an LMET graduate would send
his personnel to the school, the responses were positive [only one
negative officer] with three general response areas given most often.
First, was the desire to increase knowledge in the area of leadership
theory and to increase learning and vocabulary in the field of
management. Second, was the idea of personal improvement through a
further awareness, either to "get-well" or to make good leaders better.
Third, is that individuals are required to go through LMET school via
PCS orders, that is, it is an expected training evolution for career
personnel. To discuss these three areas in more detail, the data [see
Table 4] indicates that an overwhelming majority of sampled graduates
view LMET school as a useful training evolution. Specifically, the
training was reported to provide a general background of leadership/
management theory complete with a specific vocabulary. This new
vocabulary allows the graduate to be able to converse easier with
supervisors and subordinates and often times provides names and labels
to leadership styles and managerial techniques which they have already
been practicing. The next perception held by graduates, appears to be
that LMET training can provide poor leaders with the tools necessary to




REASONS FOR ATTENDING LMET SCHOOL







or to "get well"
Learn how to "get along"
with people
Learn how to influence people



















11 6/ 6/ 14 *
Additional Respondent Comments:
. 3 LMET Graduates, 6 Supervisors and 2 Subordinates stated that some
form of LMET training should concentrate on E-4 and above instead of
E.6 and above.
. Officer LMET Graduates had the widest range of remarks as seen below:
.it [LMET School] was of little practical value."
a ticket punch."
.a waste of time."
.can't change behavior."
.need some shipboard experience first."
,it was a good experience."
.prepared me for a leadership role."
.1 now understand people better."
.1 learned how to organize my time."
.it was good background enrichment."
.it points out strengths and weaknesses."
^Comments in this category varied and were generally favorable toward
LMET School. Total does not include 1 Commissioned Officer who voiced a
negative opinion. Supervisor/Subordinate columns will not sum to 51




this notion may be a feeling of inadequacy or lack of time in which
fleet managers and leaders feel unable to provide on-the-job leader-
ship/management training. The final perception was that LMET training
is a promotion hurdle that has to be passed, that is, the training is
career enhancing.
b. Why LMET?
In addition to questioning the graduates, supervisors and
subordinates were similarly questioned as to what their thoughts were
concerning their desire to attend LMET. Most of the responses from
individuals that had not attended the LMET training concerned
perceptions about what LMET could do for them. The first of three
general perceptions was a feeling of inadequacy in non-LMET personnel
[especially junior enlisted] to assume positions of leadership and
management without formal training. Second, was the feeling of needing
additional ideas on how to lead and manage others, that is, their
actual skills needed expanding. The third impression was that LMET
training would provide the "right way" to lead and manage others.
While they were not able to relate these ideas to the LMET school
curriculum itself, it does imply the type of reputation that the
program possesses. Fleet personnel look upon the LMET training in a
positive light. They expect LMET to improve their leadership/manage-
ment skills as well as to be provided with the "right way" to lead and
manage others. In summary, the reaction to LMET training seems to
receive favorable considerations from both graduates and non-graduates





The second level or domain to be addressed is that concerning
what the LMET graduates actually learned. They are tested on this
level prior to leaving the school and the interview process did not
specifically seek data on it, nevertheless several insights were
revealed.
a. LMET Knowledge
For those graduates who had been away from the school for
a length of time [6 months or longer], there were indications that they
had forgotten some of the specific content-knowledge of their LMET
training. However, as the interview progressed, they tended to recall
some of these specifics and began to respond to interview questions
using the LMET school vocabulary. The actual interviews appeared to
surface training concepts which initially appeared to have been
forgotten.
b. Setting Goals and Performance Standards
Of the five competency clusters taught during LMET school,
the data indicates that the competency group of efficiency and
effectiveness seems to be the least understood and practiced. Concern-
ing efficiency and effectiveness, it can be paraphrased as, "Doing
things well, and wanting to do better". [HRMC,N.D.] It includes
setting goals and performance standards.
Behaviors demonstrated by one who sets goals
and performance standards include the following:
Establishes specific work goals
*Is concerned for standards of task performance
Revises goals to make them realistic
Sets deadlines for task accomplishment [HRMC,N.D.]
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As indicated in Table 5 and 6, LMET graduates expressed adequate
knowledge concerning goal setting, establishing performance standards
for subordinates and clarifing evaluation standards. However, when
specifically asked whether they infact practiced these behaviors the
response was negative as also validated by their subordinates. The
implication is that this competency cluster remains at the
knowledge-content domain. It would appear from the sample that LMET
graduates do not routinely practice setting goals and performance
standards for their subordinates. Additionally, LMET graduates sampled
do not seek clarification from their supervisors as to goals and
expectations that apply to themselves. As best expressed by an LMET
petty officer graduate M 1 guess I don't really tell them what I
expect... I know I should."
In summary, the data analyzed from the interviews within
the 13 commands indicates that sampled LMET graduates are knowledgeable
concerning the content of their training. However, there appears to be
a lack of application in certain areas. A lack of application that
some freely admit.
3. Behavior
The pilot study research was directed specifically at this
third domain - the behavioral level, that is, whether the LMET gradu-
ates exhibit any behavioral changes. Overall, there were no systematic,
behavioral changes that ran across the sample. However, there were
isolated behavioral changes which were clearly the result of LMET




GOAL SETTING BY LMET GRADUATES
The question asked to LMET graduates was, "What goals did you set in
LMET school? Follow-up questioning and probing attempted to determine if
goal setting was used routinely as a management tool.
Response to Initial Question Officer CPO P01
1. Measurable goal dealing with
immediate future leadership/
management position 4 7 8
2. Personal goal 2 5 5
3. Vague goal involving some
phase of leadership [i.e.
"achieve good leadership",
improve leadership style",
"become a better manager"] 2 4 3
4. Forgot/don't remember
_8 J_ _2
TOTALS 16 17 18
Follow-up question results:
Officer CPO P01
Number of LMET graduates who have
established work group goals[X] 9/16 [56] 16/17 [94] 16/18 [89]
Number of LMET graduates setting
measurable goals[X] 4/16 [25] 8/17 [47] 9/18 [50]
Number of LMET graduates setting




SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS BY LMET GRADUATES
The question concerning performance measures was, "How is your per-
formance on the job measured?" Additional probing was aimed at estab-
lishing specific measures. A rephrasing of the question to, "How do you
know when you're doing a good job?", was particularly effective.
I. LMET Graduate Self-Report Response*
Performance Measurements OFT CPO P01
Task accomplishment ["get the job done"] 13 13 14
Technical proficiency in rate or specialty 4 6 3
Manage the work group [emphasis on smooth-
ness of operation] 1 5 3
Do not know 2 2 4
Amount of feedback provided supervisor 4 4 1
Effective training program 1 2 1
Establishing good interpersonal re-
lationship with subordinates 2 1
Goal setting 2
Prioritizing workload properly 2 3
Keep supervisor out of trouble 1 1 2
Appearance of workgroup personnel 1 1 1
Material Resource Management 1 1 1
Morale of work group personnel 2 1
Keeping up with administration [paper work] 2
Amount of flexibility 1 2
Monitoring work group 2 1
Work group planning 3 1





II. Validated LMET Graduate Performance Measurements*
Supervisor Validation LMET
Agree with Disagree with graduates
graduate graduate not knowing
Officer 9 3 2
CPO 10 3 2
P01 9 4 4
Totals: 28 10 8
III. PERCEIVED PERFORMANCE STANDARDS OF SUBORDINATES TO LMET GRAUDATES
Do not know Task Accomplishment Others
Officer 4 7 1
CPO 4 9 4
P01 3 12 2
Totals: 11 28 7
*This tabulation presents the LMET graduates perceived performance
measurements as opposed to the immediate supervisor's stated performance
measurements. Totals may not equal number of graduates due to supervisor
or subordinate not interviewed for this question.
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took place the personnel were clearly looking for help. 22 They
attended LMET school as a "get well" measure with a substantial felt
need to improve. In general, those that exhibited the hoped for
behaviors or competencies indicated that they did so prior to LMET
school, while those not exhibiting the behaviors desired did not see
the value of those competencies, feeling they were not applicable in
their specific situation.
a. Seniority among LMET Graduates
The data seemed to indicate that there may be a
correlation [negative] between senority and extent of behavioral
change. As Table 7 seems to indicate, chief petty officers are less
affected by LMET training as far as changing their behavior. While
there is some subjective indication that they in fact can better
appreciate what is being taught and how it applies due to their
experience, it seems that they tend to be more skeptical towards new
ideas. The tendency seems to be, to use the LMET training as a
reinforcement of their own leadership/managerial style by adhering to
those competencies that reflect their own style. The notion of more
senior LMET graduates using LMET to reinforce past behavior, thereby
reducing the likelihood of behavioral change is reflected in the
following chief petty officer's comments:
...not really, [no change] I found that what they
brought out in LMET was basically what I was doing
before I went.
...you might be able to modify a man but you can't
change his behavior.
...I don't think so. . .[behavioral change] there are
some things they pointed out that I do use... the way
I handle the men is the same.
<^The behavior change was validated by supervisors and




EXHIBITED BEHAVIORAL CHANGE OF LMET GRADUATES
Yes Yes Yes/No* No No
[A great deal [Minimum [Disagreement [little [Definatly
of change] Change] between graduate change None]
& supervisor/ if any]
subordinate]
Officer 2 5 2/ 3 4
CPO 3 2 2/0 10
P01 6 17/1 3
Total J_LC21.6%] 8[15.7%] 11/1[21.6X/1.9X] 3[5.9%] 17f33.3%1
19[37.3%] 22[23.5%] 20[39.2%]
*In this column "Yes" means the graduate states there has been a change and
supervisor/subordinate state no change. A "No" means the graduate believes




I can't say that [leadership style] has really
changed.. .basically I am the same person, the way
I lead my people.
No, I think LMET made me realize some of my
strengths and weaknesses so far as leading men,
however, I thought I had more strengths than
weaknesses.
The more junior officers and petty officers seem to view
LMET as a valuable and much needed training program. Among first class
petty officers in particular, LMET training seems to provide the leader-
ship/management theories and tools with which they are able to do their
jobs. Additionally, this group has had sufficient experience to
appreciate the curriculum structure and content. The data seems to
indicate that first class petty officers are the most affected group of
the 3 sampled levels and exhibit the greatest potential for behavioral
change. For sampled junior officers, especially ensigns, there seems to
be less indication of any behavioral change [for new ensigns this is
primarily due to a lack of experience in not knowing how they led and
managed others prior to LMET]. While these junior officers express a
great felt need for the LMET training with its role in preparing them to
assume their duties, their behavior does not indicate that they readily
apply the competencies. Perhaps as was suggested by the junior officers
themselves, LMET school [as presently scheduled], sandwiched between
Surface Warfare Officer School and other specific training schools
[Communication Officer, DCA School, Electronic Warfare, etc.], looses
its impact by the time the officers reach the fleet. Then in the rush
to fit into their operational command and specific billet the LMET
training seems to get lost and forgotten, perhaps due to their inexperi-




Of the five competency clusters taught during LMET school,
two are particularly dependent upon good communication flow. The first
cluster concerns the skillful use of influence and is paraphrased as:
"Using influence in a positive fashion. . .not as a personal end-but
towards Navy goals and effectiveness." [HRMC.N.D.] Components of this
0'
-
competency cluster include, influences, team builds, developes sub-
ordinates and self-control. The thread that runs throughout this
competency is communication. The analysis of data gathered during the
study [Table 8] seems to indicate that sampled LMET graduates do not
apply this competency to its fullest extent due to poor communications.
A lack of communication, specifically in feedback concern-
ing performance, was sited throughout the interviews of both graduates
and their subordinates and supervisors. Interestingly, it included both
the lack of positive as well as negative feedback, but especially
emphasized the notion of positive feedback. This lack of positive feed-
back among those interviewed indicated that a substitute for positive
feedback became the very lack of any feedback. When querried as to how
they knew when they were doing a good job, a common response from
sampled graduates and subordinates was: "I really don't know, if I don't
hear anything then I must be doing all right." This substitution of a
lack of any communication for actual positive feedback appeared to be a
common occurence among respondents.
Other indications of poor communication involved a lack of
including subordinates in the planning stages of task accomplishment




LMET GRADUATE SELF-REPORT ON INFLUENCING
This data was gathered during the course of answering three related
questions concerning the process used to accomplish a newly assigned
task, assigning duties and responsibilities to subordinates and the
handling of roadblocks. Respondents were encouraged to site specific
examples. The analysis rated the answers on a scale of 1-5 within the











Effectiveness 1 4 8 3
Skillful Use of
Influence 1 2 5 4 4
Management Control 2 6 8
Conceptual Thinking 1 3 3 9





Chief Petty Officer LMET Competency







Efficiency & Effectiveness 2 3 12
Skillful use of Influence 2 3 5 7
Management Control 2 5 10
Conceptual Thinking 2 6 9
OVERALL: 6 5 19 38
First Class Petty Officer
LMET Graduate 1 2 3 4 5
Efficiency & Effectiveness 1 2 6 9
Skillful use of Influence 1 4 2 4 7
Management Control 1 2 3 12
Conceptual Thinking 2 3 5 9
OVERALL: 1 8 9 18 36
Additional data on the "Skillful Use of Influence" competency cluster
was gained by asking the graduate, "How do you go about getting someone to
buy your ideas about a better way of doing things?"
Chief Petty First Class
Officer Officer Petty Officer TOTAL
Do nothing unless asked
Order it done
Argue that is the way it has
always been done or you have
seen it done this way before.
If accepted fine.
Trial and Error Approach
Argue strongly in its favor,
pointing out strengths, make it








often rejected with little to no explanation, or with out trying them
out. A common practice seemed to be not consulting with subordinates at
all.
"Advising and Counseling" is the second competency cluster
affected by a weakness in communications and includes the components;
positive expectations, realistic expectations and understanding. This
competency group places particular emphasis on the communication aspect
under the component of expectations. Realistic expections include:
*A realistic concern that instructions will be
followed or carried out effectively by others.
*0pen acknowledgement of negative expectations
about the shortcomings of others.
*A willingness to express displeasure, diss-
appointment, and concern about the short-
comings of an individual's performance.
[HRMD.N.D.]
Again, communication is seen as an integral part of this competency.
The interviews seem to indicate that in this area there is a great deal
of communication between graduates and their subordinates. However, the
emphasis appears to be only on the negative aspect while ignoring the
other components of positive expectations and understanding. As Table 9
indicates, supervisors ire quick to provide verbal feedback and
counseling for poor performance. Yet for good performance, none of the
sampled LMET graduates indicated they would specifically counsel their
subordinates. However, verbal feedback in the form of a "job well done"
was given. The indication seems to be that the sampled LMET graduates
view counseling as a tool for correcting poor performance with much less
emphasis on good performance.
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c. Rewarding and Disciplining Performance
The fourth competency cluster taught during LMET school is
that of "Management Control", which includes the following six
components:
*Plans and Organizes





The first four components of this competency appears to be
used with varying degrees of success as indicated by the data [Table 8].
While sampled LMET graduates did not always indicate they involved
others in the planning, they certainly made efforts to optimize
resources and delegate tasks to a lower level. The last two components,
rewards and disciplines, did not appear to be integrated into the
sampled LMET graduates behavior.
As indicated in Table 9, the use of rewards was
substantially limited to three areas, verbal recognition [formal and
informal], time off from work, and written evaluations. Of these three
responses, written evaluations may be downplayed, as few respondents
suggested special or commendatory evaluations but rather indicated good
performance would be noted on formal, periodic written evaluations.
Since the Navy evaluation process expects or insists supervisors do
this, it cannot be truly viewed as much as a reward as something earned.
This feeling was best expressed by LMET subordinates, one who remarked,
"He didn't give me a good evaluation, I earned it!" The other two
major types of rewards were verbal rewards and time off from work, with
both more heavily relied upon by the first class petty officers.




LMET GRADUATES SELF-REPORT ON ADVISING AND COUNSELING,
AND REWARDS AND DISCIPLINES
This data was gathered from responses to two related questons,
"What do you do if the work of a subordinate is: worse than expected?
Better than expected?"*
No or Low use
of LMET
Competencies






Efficiency & Effectiveness 1 1 3 5 6
Skillful use of Influence 2 6 2 6
Advising and Counseling 3 1 3 9
Management Control 3 3 3 7
OVERALL: 4 6 13 13 28
Chief Petty Officer 1 2 3 4 5
Efficiency & Effectiveness 1 8 8
Skillful use of Influence 1 5 5 6
Advising and Counseling 1 1 6 9
Management Control 1 4 7 5
OVERALL: 3 11 26 28
*This Table was prepared using the LMET graduate's responses from the





First Class Petty Officer 1
Efficiency & Effectiveness




ss 1 8 9
; 1 7 3 7
1 1 7 9
1 6 5 6
1 3 14 23 31
Specific responses to the two querries follow:
"If work is worse"
Verbal Re.
Co unsel Reprimand Tas
Officer 13 8 3
CPO 15 12 6
POl 15 10 5
Do Extra.Mil itary Formal Reassign



















Officer 11 4 10 6 6
CPO 15 4 10 9 8
POl 16 6 16 11 4
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institutionalized as to almost lose their status as rewards. Personnel
who work late, especially hard or do a job particularly well expect to
be rewarded both verbally and with time off. To not give these rewards
seems to be viewed as a form of punishment. In addition, all three of
these rewards require only a small amount of effort for the supervisor,
hence, the propensity towards their use. The fact that chief petty
officers and officers are reluctant to give time off as compared to
petty officers may be indicative of their view of the organization, the
amount of work to be completed as well as more direct pressure from
seniors to account for absent personnel. Written awards, commendations
and recommendations for medals was given a lower priority as a means of
rewarding personnel for good performance for a variety of reasons. Most
common seemed to be the concept that good performance was expected,
hence not worthy of such a "high" reward. Yet few graduates were able
to verbalize what sort of performance did deserve such an award. It was
the interviewer's perception that the problem was not the level of the
award but the amount of personal involvement needed to give such an
award.
"The last component, discipline, seemed to share the same
sort of priorities as rewards. That is, disciplinary actions that
involved a substantial amount of interaction with the supervisor were
avoided. As Table 9 indicates, counseling [negative feedback] and
verbal reprimands were the most commonly cited means of disciplining.
It is perhaps no coincidence that these forms involved the least amount
of a supervisor's effort. Even "counseling" can be conducted with
little preparation and informally so as to be yery efficient from a time
perspective. Redoing the task and Extra Military Instruction [EMI] both
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involve a high degree of interaction with the supervisor in the form of
close monitoring and instruction. Both methods were shunned as
indicated by the data, especially at the officer/chief petty officer
level. Actual punitive measures such as non-judicial Captain's Mast
were viewed by those respondents who mentioned it as a last ditch
effort, only to be used when all else failed. What is significant is
the relatively few respondents that even mentioned it. A final note
should be made concerning the officers who would reassign a task
improperly completed to another person who could be relied upon to get
it completed. This would seem to indicate an extreme propensity for
task accomplishment at any cost, and if so, would be highly divergent to
the LMET approach to leadership.
d. Increased Awareness
A final area of behavioral change concerns overall change,
perhaps better called an awareness or attitudinal change. That is, the
graduate's awareness towards, leadership/management as well as his
affect on other people has increased which is manifested in some
behavioral changes. Table 7 indicates that approximately two thirds
[61%] of the sampled graduates expressed either a change in their
leadership style or in adopting a leadership philosophy more closely in
line with LMET. Of these graduates, half have in fact changed or
adopted an LMET approach as validated by their supervisors and
subordinates. One third of the total sample have exhibited no change as
validated by their supervisors and subordinates. This means about one
fourth [23.5%] of all graduates believe they have changed yet this
change is not validated. The significance of this data seems to be that
behavioral change brought about by LMET varies greatly, based upon a
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variety of factors. However, it does seem clear that behavioral change
as a specific result of LMET school is not at all assured.
4. Results
The last domain or level to be examined is that of results,
which in fact is what an evaluation of the entire LMET Program should
most likely explore. The priority question is whether the program does
in fact result in real changes to the bottom line measures. This pilot
study was not designed to definitively address the specific domain of
"results". Without a control group of non-LMET graduates to compare
against, and the numerous non-LMET related factors that affect
productivity [e.g., technical training, size of work group, imagination,
etc.] there may be no satisfactory method of determining the cause and
effect relationship between LMET and "results" outcomes. Despite these
difficulties and recognizing the limitations of the sample itself, some
indications of the effect of LMET on bottom line measurements were
uncovered.
a. Job Performance Changes
First, most sampled LMET graduates reported that job per-
formance measures had increased or remained high in their work groups
[this was validated by both subordinates and supervisors] since their
completion of training [see Table 10]. Of particular interest is that
first class petty officers report lower perceived impact on work group
performance than do the chief petty officers or officers. This may
reflect the first class petty officer's perception that being lower in
the chain of command affords them less chance to influence the system.




CHANGE IN THE LMET GRADUATE'S WORK GROUP PERFORMANCE AND SATISFACTION
Perceived Performance Changes:
Yes, Yes, No, No No, Yes, Yes,
major minimum remain ed remainled Minor major
increase increase high low decrease decrease
Officer 6 4 1 3 1 1
CPO 4 7 3 3
P01 4 6 1 6 1









13 4 1 1
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may well reflect a willingness on their part to experiment with
leadership/managerial styles as well as use of their relative position
of higher influence. Chief petty officers may also enjoy a position
form which it is easier to influence improved performance. This
hypothesis is supported by a comment from one subordinate who stated,
"We got a chief so things got better."
b. Job Satisfaction Changes
As for satisfaction measures within a work group [increased
retention, less non-judicial punishments, less sick calls and
absenteeism], there was no consistent pattern of change across the
entire sample which could be attributed to LMET. While Table 10 seems
to indicate some positive changes in satisfation, the respondents
credited most change to environmental changes [e.g., return from
deployment, finishing shipyard overhaul, etc.] or to the personality
[e.g., nice person, good conversationist, easy going, etc.] of the LMET
graduate and not so much to the leadership style. However, the inter-
views seemed to indicate that when LMET graduates did infact involve
subordinates in the decision making process and opened clear lines of
communication that job satisfaction did increase. Of particular note
was the case of two petty officers who did a complete turnaround in
leadership/management styles after LMET [attended on a TAD basis]. In
their cases the change was clearly noticable to supervisors and
subordinates and in fact resulted in measureable increases in both job
performance and satisfaction measures.
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c. Retention Aspects of LMET
Concerning retention, the data do not indicate any
systematic cause and effect relationships between retention and LMET
training. However, there were specific cases in which there appeared to
be an LMET influence toward increased retention within the work group.
The graduates themselves indicated that LMET training had little effect
on their own career plans. This is perhaps not surprising when
examining who is actually attending LMET school. Chief petty officers
and first class petty officers tend to be career oriented personnel or
have at least made definate plans concerning re-enlistment. Regardless,
they tend to be a tough group to sway one direction or the other.
Junior officers on the other hand, while more undecided about their
careers, appear to* be unwilling to make a career committment based soley
upon a positive LMET experience.
LMET graduates on the other ,hand, did have some positive
effect on retention within their work groups. Several subordinates
readily admitted that the actions of their LMET graduate boss had in
fact been the determining factor in their re-enlistment decision. One
LMET graduate had a 100 per cent re-enlistment rate [supervisor-report-
ed]. However, the question still remains as to whether this was all or
even in part due to LMET. At least one certainty can be stated, that is
that no respondent indicated they were leaving the Navy as a result of
LMET.
d. Developing Healthy Climates
With respect to developing healthy organizations or work
groups, LMET graduates seemed to give this a high priority and dre in




INDICATION OF HEALTHY WORK GROUPS OF LMET GRADUATES
This data was gathered on the question, "What happens to your work
center when you are not there?"
2 3 4 5
Just enough Major jobs All work All work
is done to continue, done, accept gets done
stay out of some minor supervisors including
trouble ones don't supervisor14 7 2
1 7 3** 5
4 3 9









One officer was not asked this question as he was in the process of
relieving the old division officer.
**These chief petty officers all specified that only the division officers
collateral duties would not get done.
***0ne P01 was not asked this question due to his newness to the work group
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LMET graduates stated that they had in fact trained their subordinates
to take over in their absence. There was some question as to how well
their work group would function [quality of performance], but not
whether it would function. In those few instances when the LMET
graduate indicated that the work group would not function at all or at a
level to barely get by, the LMET graduate appeared to not practice the
LMET competencies, especially skillful use of influence. The overall
indications were that LMET graduates who practiced what was taught,
tended to create healthy organizations by training subordinates to take
on increased responsibility, delegating decisions to lowest possible
levels, encouraging communication up and down the chain of command and
using their influence to positively motivate their subordinates,
e. Handling Newly Reported Personnel
A related area to retention and building a healthy work
group is how new personnel are integrated into the work group. Table 12
indicates that LMET graduates tend to concern themselves with a new
persons first impression. Most graduates stressed the use of the
reporting aboard interview as a means of explaining where the new person
fits within the organization as well as his importance to the
organization. The interview was also used to inform the new individual
of promotion plans, career development, training programs, and daily
routines/standard operating procedures. This interview stressed the
necessity of discussing any personal problems that might prevent easy
transition into the work group. The one subject that was not discussed
tended to be the expected performance or goals for the newly reported















Officer 1 3 4 3 4 2









OVERALL: 3 5 13 12 16
1-Two officers not asked this question
2".... Royal Red Carpet Treatment." - Division Officer
"....Like to find out what they expect from the Navy to help satisfy
their need." - Division Officer
3
"I don't want him to do the shit jobs right off the bat." - CPO
"I let him play pigeon for a few days." - CPO
4" I just put them straight to work.... the first day they come to me, I
give them a chipping hammer and a wire brush and away they go." - POl
5" I see all personnel for administrative purpose only." - POl
6"
I guess I don't really tell him what I expect.. .1 don't express it..
I assume he will talk to his co-workers." - POl
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would be picked up from peers. This idea was best stated by an LMET
first class petty officer, "I guess I don't really tell him what I
expect... I don't express it... I assume he will talk to his co-workers."
Aside from the reporting aboard interview, LMET graduates
expressed a wide variety of methods for handling newly reported
personnel as indicated in the following interview remarks:
I don't want him to do the shit jobs right off
the bat...CP0
...let him play pigeon [running-mate concept] for
a few days - P01
...I like to find out what he expects from the
Navy to help satisfy his needs - Div Off
...I just put him straight to work... The first day
they come to me I give them a chipping hammer and
a wire brush and away they go - P01
...I give them the royal red carpet treatment for
a few days - Div Off
The LMET graduates that tended to place less emphasis on smoothly
integrating personnel into their work groups more consistently were
those that had the least healthy organizations,
f. LMET Reinforcement
Another aspect of the "results" level was briefly
discussed earlier within the knowledge-content domain. It concerns the
LMET graduates unmindful disregard of LMET concepts and vocabulary at
the beginning of the individual interviews with a noticeable improve-
ment as the interview progressed. It appeared that the graduate had
totally forgotten some of the LMET issues and language of the training.
As Table 13 indicates, 61% of the graduates never used their student




LMET GRADUATE'S SELF-REPORT ON USE OF THE STUDENT JOURNAL
The initial question for this data was, "Have you ever used the
student journal." In some cases the response was "Yes" but not for






Chief Petty Officer 5
2
12
First Class Petty Officer 8
3
JO
TOTALS [%]: 20 [39] 31 [61]
*0f these seven, 4 used it for reasons related to LMET.
2 0f these five, 3 used it for reasons related to LMET.
3 0f these eight, 7 used it for reasons related to LMET,
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11% of the sample actually used the journal as a reference or guide to
a problem they were encountering. This is inspite the fact that the
manual's intended use is as a guide and reference list for the LMET
competencies. Additionally, it is designed to be used in helping to
establish and track self. improvement goals in leadership and management
development for each graduate. The indication seems to be that by not
actively using the student journal, LMET graduates are not keeping the
compentencies foremost in mind as tools for leadership and management.
A last general observation, based on responses to the
query as to whether they had anything else they would like to mention,
was that if a command explicitly or implicitly discouraged the use of
the LMET situational approach to leadership and management, a very high
level of frustration developed within the graduate. Graduates that
expressed having experienced this problem seemed to use three different
techniques to cope with their anxiety. First, there were those who
continued as taught through LMET and just lived with the frustration.
This, of course, led to high dissatisfaction towards their job and
sometimes created conflicts within their work groups. The second
approach seemed to be that of doing the exact opposite of what LMET
taught. For example, using the authoritarian approach to its extreme.
Interestingly, these graduates viewed themselves as using the "old
Navy" approach and felt they were completely in line with recent CNO
policy statements concerning "pride and professionalism". The third
method seemed to be the development of a more passive existence through
the removal of oneself from the active chain of command, becoming more
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of a bystander [especially in one instance with an LMET chief petty
officer]. Apparently the graduate felt a loyalty towards the LMET
training but could not handle a situation when the supervisor did not
exhibit any support. Again, these were exceptions to most graduates
experiences as expressed in the interviews, but may nonetheless
indicate a strong need for external support mechanisms in order for
LMET to succeed.
C. SUMMARY OF LMET FINDINGS
Again, the findings concerning LMET must be strictly viewed within
the context of the limitations of a non-random sample. The issues
identified and the points raised should be considered hypotheses which
need to be resolved through either further study, or within a more
complete full-scale evaluation to test their actual validity. However,
the following general comments, while not all inclusive, are felt to be
indicative of the pilot study sample and are therefore included as a
convenient summary.
Reactions of personnel interviewed concerning LMET were upbeat,
with the majority of respondents in agreement as to its necessity and
usefulness. LMET was viewed as a positive experience which seems to
have affected graduates in differing degrees. The actual knowledge of
LMET training, while not always initially evident, appeared good.
While systematic behavioral changes linked directly to LMET were not
uncovered, there were specific examples and indications that behavioral
changes had taken place.
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LMET program strengths such as graduate increased awareness, the
fulfillment of manager's training needs in the areas of management/
leadership, developing a positive framework for healthy work groups,
among others were notably in evidence. Several areas of concern were
identified and require further investigation to determine their
validity. Among these issues were the following four:
Communication Aspects of Rewarding and Disciplining
The Setting of Goals and Performance Standards
Feedback Concerning Performance
The LMET Student Journal
It is unclear to the extent in which the LMET pilot study findings
are general izable to the entire population. They nevertheless re-




VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This final chapter contains the conclusions concerning the useful-
ness of the pilot study concept as well as recommendations concerning a
future overall evaluation of the LMET program. As such, the chapter
emphasizes an overview of three general areas of concern; the pilot
study concept, particularly as applied to the evaluation of LMET; the
interview as a data gathering methodology; and relevant issues
requiring further investigation in developing an evaluation plan for
the Navy's LMET program. These three areas of concern are divided into
two sections for presentation; first, the pilot study conclusions and
second, the recommendations concerning an LMET evaluation.
A. PILOT STUDY CONCLUSIONS
The central theme throughout this research has been the pilot
study concept. Although previously stated, it is of sufficient import-
ance to re-emphasize that the data sample for this study was neither
random nor representative of the Navy's LMET graduates. The 51 LMET
graduates that were interviewed contained a cross-section of various
operational commands, billets, rates, ranks, warfare specialties and
geographic locations from the west coast. However, the data was suffi-
cient for this pilot study in attempting to identify issues, test
hypotheses, and evaluate a methodology pertaining to the future overall
evaluation of a major Navy program such as LMET. In no way has this
pilot study eliminated the need for an LMET evaluation, rather it rein-
forces that need. ,._
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An important question that remains unanswered and requires further
examination is, how should effectiveness of LMET or any similarly large
program be measured? This pilot study concentrated on individual
behavioral changes in leadership/management after LMET graduation.
Other effectiveness criteria for the LMET program could include, but
are not limited to: individual command effectiveness, reduction of
selected Navy-wide problems or concerns [e.g. retention, substance
abuse, etc.], and knowledge/behavior of graduates 6 months after LMET
training. The underlying issue is determining what is the actual
purpose or goal of the Navy's LMET program. Once that is clearly
defined, then an evaluation of its progress towards achieving that goal
can more easily be conducted.
The continued emphasis on the limitations of this pilot study is
not intended to diminish its usefulness to LMET program managers and
decision makers. Rather, it is to keep the pilot study results within
their proper perspective, that of providing preliminary guidance
towards a full-scale LMET evaluation. This study did examine the LMET
training with the stated objective of providing substantive recommenda-
tions for conducting a full-scale evaluation of the program. The
beneficial accomplishments derived from the pilot study concept as re-
lated to general program evaluation fall into four categories;






The first accomplishment, that of efficiency, can be ex-
amined from three different resource perspectives: minimum manpower,
low cost, and short duration. This pilot study was conducted by two
lieutenant commander, Naval Postgraduate School students in working on
their master's degree thesis. Their time was already committed to some
form of thesis work, and in undertaking a pilot study of the Navy's
LMET program, they, as well as the Navy, were able to benefit in
"killing two birds with one stone". While it may not always be easy to
find such an efficient situation, the fact of the matter is that two
Navy personnel conducted the study, which underscores the efficiency of
this approach. Further emphasizing efficiency is the pilot study's re-
latively low cost. Only $10,000 was allocated for this research,
which, when compared to an overall program evaluation, seems well
worthwhile to insure the usefulness of the full evaluation. Finally,
there is the timeliness aspect of the pilot study, 6 months from start
to finish. It should be noted that this was accomplished in addition




The next accomplishment of the pilot study is in the area of
effectiveness. When this pilot study commenced, the problem that was
most difficult to acertain was how to measure effectiveness of such a
large program. It was not clear at the outset exactly what to measure
or how. The flexibility afforded by only two people
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undertaking such a study was another primary cost savings. As issues
were identified, questions developed, and the evaluation method
formalized, the two researchers were able to easily adjust and proceed
with few problems. This \/ery flexibility permitted the gathering of an
enormous amount of high quality information on a complex, dynamic Navy-
wide system.
3. Definitive Results
The third major accomplishment of this pilot study is that it
produced definitive results. It did develop issues and recommendations
on how to conduct a full-scale evaluation of the LMET program. These
findings, issues, and recommendations can be used by program managers
and decision makers in developing a plan for the further evaluation of
this program with a certain amount of assurance that they are indeed
proceeding in a relevant direction.
4. Education and Learning
The final accomplishment, that of education and learning,
while not an intended goal, further establishes the value of a pilot
study. In order to develop a pilot study design for the LMET program,
it was necessary to first learn about the program. The background re-
search conducted resulted in insights into the overall LMET program,
from theoretical conception to development through implementation.
Additionally, a feeling for and an understanding of the program, as it
is now administered, was gained by the researchers. The implication is
that these two researchers may be as knowledgeable, if not more so,
than the actual program managers of LMET. This educational feature of




5. Future Pilot Studies
With these four considerations in mind let us now briefly
examine the future potential of pilot studies within the Navy. On the
surface it appears that the benefits far outweigh the costs of a pilot
study completed prior to a comprehensive program evaluation. If more
program evaluations were designed with a pilot study as their first
step, program managers by involving themselves, could feel more confid-
ent in directing the full -scale evaluation. A pilot study can examine
relevant issues such as who, how and what to evalute. Program
managers using this approach can gain valuable insight and direction
for their program evaluations, thereby making better decisions. The
pilot study concept can be viewed as another tool that managers and
decision makers can use to improve the quality and timeliness of their
decisions.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING LMET EVALUATION
This section addresses some definitive recommendations concerning
a future full-scale evaluation of LMET. These recommendations are
organized to answer four central questions concerning that evaluation:
who?, where?, how?, and what? While not all inclusive, it is felt that
these insights will provide sufficient guidance to LMET program mana-
gers to develop a useful evaluation plan.
1. Who
The first question concerning the evaluation plan is who, and
can be further divided into four topical areas; the individual LMET
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graduate, the chain of command, operational commands, and evaluators.
All of these areas when viewed together shed light on the who question,
a. LMET Graduates
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the LMET program
it is necessary to collect data from those individuals most affected by
the training, which in this case are the graduates. Behavior modifi-
cation or improvement in the area of leadership/management is one of
the goals of the program. In order to collect relevant data which
reflects the extent of this improvement [as well as a possible cause
and effect relation to the training], a sufficient amount of time after
graduation must have elapsed in order for the graduate to have develop-
ed his operating style. It is recommended that data be collected from
LMET graduates who have been out of LMET school for a minimum of 6
months. However, as time increases from graduation, a cause and effect
relationship may become contaminated due to other factors. In addi-
tion, due to the multi-levels of training as well as the number of
graduates, data collection should concentrate specifically on middle
managers, such as: department heads, division officers, chief petty
officers [CPO] and first class petty officers [POT]. In comparing the
responses of department heads/CPO's with division off icers/POl 's the
issue of seniority as compared to changes in behavior can be further
explored. Realizing that data collected from graduates [self-report]
may be suspect, it is further recommended that a validation procedure
be implemented. The validation process used in the pilot study of
collecting additional data on the graduate from his immediate super-
visor and subordinate would work quite well.
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b. Chain of Command
An issue that surfaced as a result of the pilot study, was
the effect that the chain of command had on a graduate towards applying
the training. By collecting data on the entire chain of command, the
effect of command support for the graduate can be further explored.
Additionally, as time permits, indications of whether the graduate is
considered an average or superior performer should be sought to assist
in confirming the graduates self-reported information, as well as a
first step in revalidating the competencies on a hierarchical basis.
c. Operational Commands
Since the LMET program has been initially directed at
operational commands, the greatest impact, hence potential for change,
would be expected to occur there. As such, operational commands should
be the specific targets of the evaluation. One additional considera-
tion is in the choice of which graduates to specifically emphasize.
Since leadership/management behavior [change or improvement] is the
emphasis of the evaluation, only graduates in this role should be con-
sidered. Air squadrons for example, have many junior officer [ENS,
LTjg] graduates who do not hold active leadership/management positions
and would therefore provide little substantive data.
d. Evaluators
The final issue is who should conduct the evaluation -
civilians or Navy personnel? Constraints of sample size, time and man-
power availability may be the deciding factors of actually who will
conduct the evaluation, civilian or military personnel. However, one
issue is clear, that the program managers should take an active role
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in order to educate themselves on the LMET program. The issue of
whether to employ civilian or military evaluators hinges to a great
extent on the data collection method used. If interviewing, Navy
personnel may have an edge, as insiders to the organization. However,
properly trained civilians, skilled in areas of behavioral psycology,
may be able to quickly overcome that advantage due to their insights on
human behavior. Additionally, Navy personnel may be more willing to
express negative opinions on the LMET program to civilians. Obviously,
using both types of personnel, exploiting their strengths would most
likely provide "the best of both worlds".
2. Where
The next major question to be addressed is where to conduct
the evaluation. To reinforce an issue discussed earlier, the
evaluation should not be conducted at the LMET school. Here graduates
will most likely provide insights of their knowledge and not behavior.
Onboard individual commands appears to be the most ideal location to
gather behavioral information. In this way the respondents can remain
within familiar, more comfortable [psychologically] surroundings. It
is also less disruptive to individual command's work schedules, hence
more likely to gain their acceptance and support. The specific concern
is that it be conducted in a neutral zone within the command where the
respondent will be less pressured by the internal environment. One
issue that did surface during the pilot study is that of the command's
environment. A cross-section of environments should be included with-
in the evaluation sample. There was an effort during the pilot study
to concentrate on commands with easy access [i.e. inport within the 3
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geographical areas], hence, a tendency to evaluate graduates on
commands in the shipyards, undergoing heavy inport maintenance programs
or training programs. Commands in all phases of employment should be
considered such as in shipyards, in homeport, deployed, during overseas
work-up exercises, and on overseas standdowns, so as to not bias the
data due to any unknown external environmental effects.
3. How
The third question, that of how, concerns the methodology to
use in conducting the evaluation. This section is further divided into
three areas of concern which are: use of interviews, use of surveys,
and mechanics of interviewing.
a. Use of Interviews
The pilot study used interviews as the primary data
collection method. It was found to be an effective means of gathering
data concerning non-quantifiable, behavioral-oriented responses. The
LMET Stimulus Questions provided by McBer and Company were particularly
useful in exploring these areas. When the desired data is directed to-
wards actual behavior with the multitude and variety of responses
possible, interviewing seems to be the best method. While straight
forward questions seeking limited responses, factual and quantifiable
data are more efficiently collected using methods other than
interviews.
b. Use of Surveys
Surveys, as opposed to interviews, are better suited
toward easily quantifiable reponses, factual data, and limited
responses. Straight forward questions that are less affected by the
124

respondents personal opinions and more directed at specific answers and
ranges of occurrences are more efficiently contained in a survey. The
survey can encompass a larger sample size quickly within the
limitations previously disscussed in earlier chapters. McBer's
"Management Behavior Survey" [partially contained in Table 14] is an
example of how to gather data on the graduate's usage of LMET
competencies. When asking straight forward questions such as these on
the competencies, the resulting data is sufficient for a broad general
overview of implications. If such a survey is administered to only the
graduates, it takes on the characteristics of an unvalidated
self-report and may therefore indicate knowledge and opinion rather
than actual behavior. Through a validation process with supervisor and
subordinate input, such a survey could provide insights into a
graduates behavior.
c. Mechanics of Interviewing
Since interviewing was the primary data gathering method
for this pilot study, it is appropriate to mention some of the lessons
learned to assist in using this method within a full-scale evaluation.
The presentation is sub-divided into four general areas of: training,
interview introduction, methodology and tools.
First, the training necessary to successfully conduct in-
terviews is minimal. While there are numerous references, R. L.
Gorden's book Interviewing: Strategy, Techniques and Tactics provides a
useful background on interviewing. A seminar or workshop on inter-
viewing as applied to the LMET evaluation process should provide
interviewers with sufficient skills to grasp the basic techniques. With
additional practice and critiquing most individuals should be able to




SAMPLE ITEMS FOR MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR QUESTIONNAIRE
Circle the number which best represents where the ratee's behavior
falls relative to the two statements provided. [For example, circling
2 would indicate a greater tendency to behave in accordance with the
statement on the left; circling 4 would indicate that both statements
are equally descriptive of his or her behavior.]
Sets goals and performance standards:
1. He/She sets clear specific
goals.
1
2. He/She will change the goals
to make them realistic.
1
He/She sets milestones when
assigning a task and checks
to see if things are on
schedule.
4
He/She sets vague goals.
He/She will keep trying to
reach a goal even if it does
not appear realistic.
He/She gives out a task and
checks back about the time it
should be done.
Takes Initiative:
4. He/She initiates action
rather than waiting to






actions to handle situations as
they develop.
He/She uses traditional, well-
established work procedures.
6. He/She spends unusually long
hours on tasks when they
require it, whether, he/she
is asked to do so or not.
He/She will work regular hours
on a task and if it takes
longer than that to complete
will come back to it later.
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Second, the introduction to the interview is a key to
establishing good rapport with the respondent, thereby ensuring a good
flow of information. A good introduction needs to stress the
confidentiality of the interview and emphasize that its overall intent
is to evaluate a program and not the individual. Putting the respond-
ent at ease initially is important and can be assisted by beginning the
interview with easier "warm-up" questions. A final point, is that most
groups of related questions have a natural flow, which should be
identified and followed. This will assist in guiding the interview
process and in fact eliminate the need to ask certain questions as they
may be answered before they arise.
The next issue is that of the interview method, and
specifically concerns interviewer/respondent interaction. The purpose
of the interviewer is to guide the conversation in the desired
direction without stifiling the information flow. Respondents will
normally use the interview as a means to voice their opinion in
unrelated areas, hence they may ramble or get off onto tangents. Firm
direction from the interviewer can keep it both healthy and on track.
However, one should not get so locked into a rigid process as to miss
the surfacing of relevant issues. These areas should be explored fully
to uncover any new areas of concern.
The final area concerns the interviewing tools available.
A variety of "tools" are available for conducting interviews, each with
definate advantages and disadvantages. The final decision on using a
tool is how it will assist in the interviewing process. If it does not
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provide advantages or specific assistance to the interviewer its use
should be carefully reconsidered. Some "tools" available for use by
the interviewer include tape recorders [should have tape counter for
indexing], coded answer sheets, and preformated interview schedules.
This last item was found to be a valuable tool in conducting the pilot
study, in that it assisted the interviewers in standardizing their
daily routine while providing the command with clear guidance as to how
to schedule their personnel.
4. What
The final question, that of what, concerns issues which should
be considered in an evaluation of the LMET program. The pilot study
surfaced certain issues which require further investigation in the
course of a full-scale evaluation. These findings should be considered
unvalidated hypotheses that require further study or additional testing
within an overall evaluation process. There are seven major issues
that will be discussed: graduate's knowledge level, increase in
self-awareness, cause and effect relationships, communication skills,
use of the journal, retention, and reinforcement of behavior.
a. Level of LMET Graduate's Knowledge
While not specifically the emphasis of the pilot study,
certain levels of knowledge exhibited by LMET graduates became evident.
Further evaluation of the LMET program should in fact try to determine
the level or degree to which LMET knowledge is retained after gradua-
tion by examining the extent to which their vocabulary and concepts
conforms to the LMET competency based model. In addition, the ability
to discuss techniques actually practiced can be compared with course
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instruction to provide some insight into how well the competency model
is understood. This data may also provide insight as to the effective-
ness of the classroom instruction at the school.
b. LMET Graduate Self-Awareness
The pilot study data do indicate that graduates have a
heightened sense of awareness on how their actions effect others as
well as how the actions of others effect them. This issue deserves
further investigation, in that this increased self-awareness could be
the first step in a more definative behavior change in leadership and
mangement style. While admittedly a self-report, if it is supported by
indications of a behavioral change then LMET should be credited for
beginning the trend towards modification of leadership/management
skills towards the competency based model.
c. Cause and Effect Relationships
The pilot study data do not support any systematic cause
and effect relationship between LMET graduates and increased
performance. There were, however, at least two cases [validated by
supervisor and subordinate] where the LMET training resulted in a
complete and highly visible turnaround in a managers behavior and
performance. However, both cases involved managers who were considered
marginal performers and were sent to the school as a last improvement
effort. The important issue that remains to be determined is: does
LMET school improve leadership/management behaviors, hence increase
managerial performance? A side issue seems clear, in that no cases
were uncovered showing any decrease in performance after LMET school.
There appears to be a definate need for further evaluation on this
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subject, to determine if LMET training alone can bring about managerial
behavior change or improvement resulting in increased performance. If
LMET school itself is not sufficient, what if any additional support is
needed?
d. LMET Graduate Communication Skills
LMET graduates overall demonstrated a noticeable weakness
in the use of communication skills and techniques in their leadership/
management roles, as supported by the pilot study data. The issue of
communication skills needs to be further investigated in order to
identify specific areas that may need additional emphasis during the
LMET training. Of the sixteen LMET taught competencies, four were
identified as specific concerns from the data. These were: a lack
among LMET graduates in setting performance standards; a lack of goal
setting, both personal and workgroup; limited use of rewards and
disciplines, coupled with a lack of flexibility for different
situations; and the use of advising and counseling for correcting poor
performance only. Each of these specific competencies can be treated
as a seperate issue for further examination and evaluation. However,
they should be recognized as related by a common thread as forms of
managerial communication.
The perception that LMET graduates seem unclear or do not
know what is expected [performance] of them, as well as their
subordinates' similar concerns, may have implications beyond LMET. This
hypotheses should be a first priority to test, using either additional
research or in the evaluation plan. While it may only be conjecture,
this and other communications concerns may well hold a key to increased
performance and satisfaction within Navy commands.
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e. Graduate Use of LMET Student Journal
This issue is two-fold in nature depending upon the
determination of the first concern, which is, what is the purpose of
the student journal? LMET designers would contend that the student
journal is a tool to be used by the graduate to help evaluate and
reinforce actual leadership performance and self-made goals outside of
the classroom. Additionally, it could serve to rearouse the LMET
competencies. As such it should reinforce skills and behaviors that
exemplify the LMET competencies while helping to correct those that do
not. Dr. Winter further explains that the student journal and its
personal student log, is the personal written record of an individual's
strengths and weaknesses, set against the Navy's standard competencies
that are associated with excellence and superior leadership
performance. [WINTER, 1979, pp.1 1-12] The first issue, then would be, to
explore the purpose of the LMET student journal. If it is determined
to be a beneficial tool to be used by the graduate, then, the second
issue would be to determine when, why, and how is it used. The data do
indicate that student use of the journal is minimal.
f. Retention
The issue of retention is of obvious importance to the
Navy, but also pertains to LMET. This issue involves two underlying
thoughts. The first is, does LMET training have any effect on the
graduate's retention? The senority aspect of this may involve an
examination of LMET's effect on junior personnel [division officers,
and first class petty officers] as opposed to its effect on more senior
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personnel [chief petty officers and department heads]. Should further
investigation reveal that LMET training has a positive impact on re-
tention, it may well indicate a need for increased emphasis on other
levels of personnel. The second thought is investigating the effect of
the graduates training on subordinates in relation to retention.
Again, if further examination indicates a positive impact on retention
by LMET graduates, it would assist in justifying the cost of the
program.
g. Reinforcement of LMET Competencies
A final issue is the need for reinforcement of LMET
competencies as perceived by the graduates. The pilot study data
indicates that LMET competencies are more likely to be practiced when
reinforced within the command [specifically by supervisors]. This
issue of internal reinforcement was also evident from several LMET
graduates who commented that active discouragement of LMET "new ideas"
not only discouraged them, but frustrated their efforts in leadership
and management. Internal reinforcement of the LMET competencies and
the resultant effect on the graduate should be furthered explored.
An additional related area requiring research is in the
area of external support for LMET training. This support or lack of
support outside of a command may provide some insight into the notion
that LMET ends upon graduation from the school. This hypothesis could
be tested during the full-scale evaluation as to whether external
support or lack of support in fact affects the application of LMET
competencies by the graduate.
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These seven issues, while not all inclusive, should
provide sufficient guidance to program managers and decision makers to
design and conduct a meaningful evaluation of the LMET program.
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This thesis has emphasized the central point that the pilot study
was not an evaluation of the LMET program, but rather the preliminary
step to overall program evaluation to determine relevant issues and
investigate a methodology to confront them. As a result, it has
uncovered issues that require further investigation through research or
within a comprehensive full-scale evaluation.
Navy leaders and managers at all levels have a real need to know
the effectiveness of the LMET program, that is, what it can or cannot
do, as well as how to best support it. In times of austere funding and
scarce resources, only those programs that can demonstrate their
usefulness should justify the support of those in control. The clear
way to demonstrate this usefulness is to conduct a program evaluation.
This can identify weaknesses requiring correction as well as strengths
that need re-emphasizing while justifying support for the program.
The pilot study concept is a useful tool for program managers and
decision makers to employ prior to committing expensive resources to an
overall evaluation. The measurement of effectiveness is at best a
tenuous business. The pilot study has explored this issue to help
develop a viable method to address effectiveness.
The flexibility afforded by a pilot study was evident in identify-
ing relevant issues which were unknown. Insights gained on the LMET
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program, as the pilot study progressed were used to update and modify
its direction. In this way, new issues were explored for relevance
almost immediately. A large scale evaluation would have found these
constant changes to be yery frustrating and costly. For the pilot
study this flexibility was gained at no extra cost. The bottom line
then becomes relevant issue identification at low cost. It must be
remembered however, that issues identified by the pilot study should be
considered unvalidated hypotheses to be further researched and explored
or perhaps tested within an overall program evaluation.
A final aspect of the pilot study which cannot be over emphasized,
is its potential as a learning device for program managers. If
involved in the pilot study, program managers can not help but gain a
sharp insight into their programs. This insight can help focus their
attention onto the relevant issues that need to be addressed in a full,
scale evaluation. Furthermore, the knowledge gained by program
managers can make it easier to monitor the progress of the larger
evaluation.
The pilot study provides a method whereby program managers can
quickly and efficiently become aware of relevant issues. More import,
antly, it can be used to provide direction and guidance for a meaning,
ful program evaluation, prior to committing extensive resources. An





LMET GRADUATE SELF-REPORT OF ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS 23
1. How long ago did you attend LMET? Did you attend prior to the
command?
2. Has there been any change in how you do your job, how you lead and
manage others, after taking the LMET course? [Probe for specific
examples]
3. Has there been any change in your own career or career plans after
taking the LMET course? [e.g. promotion, schools, PQS, retention
intentions] [Probe for specifics]
4. How is your performance on your job measured? [Probe for relevant
indicies, rewards, task accomplishment, managerial ability,
professional competence, etc.] Has there been any change in these
job performance measures? What specifically?
5. Has there been any change in your unit?
- In job performance measures (e.g. inspections passed, producti.
vity indicies, PMS accomplishment rate, accidents, etc.].
What specifically?
_ In satisfaction measures? [e.g. retention rates, NJP's, sick
calls, UA's, etc.]
6. What goals did you set in the LMET course? How have you completed
these goals? Progress? Action steps completed?
7. Have you ever used the student journal since you left the course?
For what reason? [Probe for specifics]




9. Would you send anyone to LMET school?
23jhe LMET graduate was asked these 9 questions. Questions 2-8 were
provided by McBer and Company.
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LMET GRADUATE STIMULUS QUESTIONS 24
1. When you are faced with a new task, how do you go about accomplish-
ing it?
2. In your work center, how do you assign duties and responsibilities?
What kind of paperwork do you do? [In relation to those assign.
ments]
3. What type of roadblocks do you run into on your job, and what do you
do about them?
4. What do you do if the work of your subordinates is worse than you
expected?
5. What do you do if the work of your subordinates is better than you
expected?
6. How do you go about getting someone to buy your idea about a better
way of doing things?
7. Tell me of a time when you identified a problem before anyone else
did? How did you do this?
8. How do you go about getting someone settled in who is new to the
work center? [What is expected of him?]
9. What happens to your work center when you are not there? If you
took two weeks of emergency leave what would you expect to find upon
your return? Why?
10. How do you keep cool when someone is pulling your chain?
24The LMET graduate was asked these 10 questions. All questions




SUPERVISOR QUESTIONS VALIDATING LMET GRADUATE'S ACTIVITIES
AND RESULTS 25
1. Are you an LMET graduate? How long ago did you graduate?
2. How would you describe the way in which this subordinate [division
officer, leading chief, work center supervisor] leads and manages
others? Could you give me specific examples?
3. Has there been any change in your subordinates career [e.g.
promotions, schools, PQS, accomplishments] or career plans [e.g.
re-enlistment, extensions, service obligations] while under the
supervision, leadership and management of this [division officer,
leading chief, work center supervisor]? What specifically? What
has he done?
4. How is your subordinate's [division officer, leading chief, work
center supervisor] performance measured? [Probe for specifics]
Have you changed any of these measures?
5. Has there been any changes in your unit as related to:
. job performance measures [e.g. inspections, productivity,
accidents, PMS accomplishments]
_ satisfaction measures [e.g. retention rates, NJP's, sick call,
absenti sm] What, specifically? [Probe for examples]
6. What do you like or admire most about his performance onboard?
Least? [Probe for specifics]
7. Would you work for him? Why or why not?
8. What would you change in him if you could? Why?
9. Would you send anyone to LMET school? Why?
10. Is there anything else you might like to add in regards to this
individual or LMET?
25The supervisor to the LMET graduate was asked those 10
questions. Questions 2-5 were provided by McBer and Company,
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SUBORDINATE QUESTIONS VALIDATING LMET GRADUATE'S ACTIVITIES
AND RESULTS 26
1. Are you a LMET graduate? How long ago did you graduate?
2. How would you describe the way in which your boss [division
officer, leading chief, work center supervisor] leads and
manages others? Could you give me specific examples?
3. Has there been any change in your own career [e.g. promotions,
schools, PQS accomplishments] or career plans [e.g. re. enlist,
ment, extensions, service obligations] while under the leader,
ship and management of your boss [division officer, leading
officer, work center supervisor]? What specifically? What has
he done?
4. How is your performance on the job measured by your boss
[division officer, leading chief, work center supervisor]?
[Probe for specific indicies] Have you noticed any. changes in
these performance measurements?
5. Has there been any changes in your unit as related to:
. job performance measures [e.g. inspections passed,
productivity, accidents, PMS accomplishments]
. satisfaction measures [e.g. retention rates, NJP's, sick
calls, absentism] What, specifically? [Probe for examples]
6. What do you like or admire most about his performance onboard?
Least? Can you give specifics?
7. Would you work for him again? Why or why not?
8. What would you change in him if you could? Why?
9. Would you like to attend LMET school if you could? What do you
think you would get out of it? Why?
10. Is there anything else you would like to tell me in regards to
your boss or LMET?
26The subordinate to the LMET graduate was asked these 10
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